FDCL: FDCL: Enforcement: Chapter 5 & Annexes

Christian Russau (Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum Chile/Lateinamerika e.V. - FDCL):

Enforcement of international trade regimes between the European Union (EU) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)? Foreign Direct Investment as the object of free trade negotiations: Between investors' rights, development and human rights

Translated by Jan Stehle, ed. FDCL-Verlag, Berlin, January 2004

Download [pdf 2.519 KB]

[deutsche Version]

<<< back to chapter 1 & 2 [deutschsprachige Version]
<<< back to chapter 3 & 4

Chapter 5:The enforcement of international trade regimes: The case of the free trade negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR

5.1 Foreign direct investment in bilateral investment treaties, regional free trade agreements and WTO agreements and its interaction with sectoral and horizontal topics under the rules of global free trade

The answer to the question, why the existing, already widely market-compliant liberalized rules of national legislation and international treaties are still not sufficient, can be found in the interaction of foreign direct investment with
• bilateral investment agreements,
• regional free trade agreements and
• the WTO
with different complementary “sectoral”? [319] bodies of rules and regulations concerning
• services and
• goods
as well as the “horizontal”? [320] topics of
• investment and
• the demands regarding the proposed internationally binding criteria for government procurement.
The bilateral investment agreements, with their comprehensive investors’ rights, complement the vested rights of investors already determined by the WTO and/or FTAs. If a country grants certain concessions in the framework of a BIT, then according to the MFN clause, all other BITs of this country have to contain the same “best”? conditions: A chain reaction, which as a results creates a multilateral investment agreement (MIA) through the backdoor: therefore, for example, the deputados of the Brazilian Congress should think twice and check if the consequences of ratifying a BIT really produce desired developments.
The attempt to implement the consequent commercialization of public goods and services at an international cross-border level is tried through all kinds of thinkable measures: The regulations of international treaties are irreversible once the agreements are ratified, so that broad market access, “non-discrimination”?, “national treatment”?, international arbitration courts and the determination of companies as subject of international law with rights and duties as well as binding rules for public procurement and the restriction of national mechanisms of control and influence remain as an entire body of regulations at the disposition of corporations, capital and commerce.
Foreign investors have to be granted the same rights as national ones, according to the rules of the MFN and NT clauses, and additionally foreign investors and market participants dispose of more rights as the domestic investors due to possibilities to take legal action at international arbitration courts. Furthermore, in international legal disputes international trade and investment legislation over rules national law:

“However, today’s globalization mainly rests on internationally accorded and nationally ratified rules on the liberalization of financial markets, investment and the trade of goods. Hardly one day passes, without international negotiations on further agreements. Therefore, state authority in terms of design and control occurs through international regulation and national implementation.”? [321]

Any form of national or regional performance requirements such as:
• minimum quotas of local employees,
• special consideration of local producers and suppliers in the chain of production or in public procurement processes,
• requirements for technology transfers,
• preferential treatment for domestic suppliers regarding subsidies or awarding of contracts,
• tax incentives for domestic suppliers,
which do not apply in the same way for foreign and domestic suppliers, thereby are considered as discriminatory market distortion by bilateral, regional or multilateral investment agreements, and would therefore be prohibited: national, regional or local potential for decision making in the area of implementing measures to promote development by the state is thereby complicated or completely impeded.
The commercialization of public expenditure is to be subjected as well to the regime of international trade: One of the most profitable market segments on a global level is the area of public procurement, which accounts for around 15 percent of international trade.[322]
The agreement on government procurement within the WTO has been in effect since January 1, 1996 as a plurilateral agreement, i.e., it is only binding for the states that have signed the agreement. It comprises all areas of public procurement, which have been previously defined by means of a positive-list by each state, so that the mentioned sectors are subjected to the rules of international trade like NT, MFN, market access and overall transparency. Any possibility of regulatory intervention is prohibited to the respective state, which has signed the agreement. The parties to the agreement are:

“Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Netherlands with respect to Aruba, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.”?[323]

Argentina is currently the only MERCOSUR country with the status of an “observer government”?. If this sector of public procurement is subjected to the principle of NT, as repeatedly demanded by the European Commission in the EU-MERCOSUR free trade negotiations, then large increases in sales in the then completely liberalized markets of MERCOSUR would become possible for European corporations:

“Government procurement is the term used for the purchasing activities of governmental authorities and covers purchases of everything from pencils and paper clips to computer systems and telecommunications equipment, ship building or consulting services. Government procurement is specifically exempted from the most basic of WTO disciplines (GATT Articles III:8 and XIII:1), in particular that of national treatment. Since it accounts for up to 15% of GDP, this significantly distorts trade and reduces potential growth. The only WTO regime on procurement now in existence is the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but apart from the Community, participation in this Agreement remains limited to a dozen or so Parties. The Community believes that this situation must be redressed. The Community’s own procurement market is effectively open to foreign competition but, outside the GPA, EC companies are often either de facto or de jure excluded from foreign procurement markets.”? [324]

The European side of the negotiations has presented their offer for public procurement within the framework of the EU-MERCOSUR free trade negotiations on July 14, 2003, and has shown itself “highly disappointed”?, that MERCOSUR has not presented any counter-offer:

“In the on-going talks between the EU and MERCOSUR for the resolution of an Association Agreement, the European Commission has tabled its offer on public procurement. The intention of this move was to inject dynamism to the last round of negotiations held in Asunción (Paraguay) between 23 and 27 of June 2003. Government procurement was not discussed in Asuncion, contrary to the agreed work program, given the absence of a MERCOSUR offer. EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said: “We have made ambitious proposals to open our market for trade in goods and in services and to create rules on investments, to which we now add government procurement. This is a clear a sign of our commitment to move full steam ahead. I hope MERCOSUR tables its proposal soon, so that we may inject new dynamism into the negotiations.”?

The EU’s offer on government procurement is the largest offer ever proposed in a bilateral trade negotiation. It is a WTO + proposal in that it goes beyond the EU’s engagements under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.
This offer would give MERCOSUR companies access to the EU’s lucrative government procurement market worth 200 billion Euros or about 2,4 % of the EU GDP.
The offer would allow MERCOSUR companies to participate in EU government procurement markets for goods, services and construction at preferential conditions over those applied by the EU to other WTO members.”? [325]

Everything will function exclusively according to the rules of the market; the only criteria will be price and efficiency. The corporations in the industrial countries are very well prepared for this. Lastly it is about maintaining the brutally high profit rates of corporations – especially European ones. And this makes the restless commitment of the European Commission to the global deregulation of national markets by regulation of international trade and investment regimes extremely understandable.

5.2 The case of Chile: Foreign investment regulation in the association treaty EU – Chile and its interaction with BITs and WTO rules
A very good example for this is the “Association Agreement”? of the EU with Chile, which was signed in November 2002 and entered into force in February 2003 [326], and which in its corporation-friendly orientation is amended by a series of earlier bilateral investment treaties between the European states and Chile[327]:
• The mutual market access for foreign corporations which operate in the services sector, the non-services sector and the financial services area is safeguarded by the FTA, which in its notion of services follows the four GATS definitions (Mode 1 “cross-border supply”?, Mode 2 “consumption abroad”?, Mode 3 “commercial presence”? and Mode 4 “presence of natural persons”?) and whose scope is defined by a positive-list.
• The regulation to “protect”? investment against “discrimination and expropriations”? for “post-establishment”? investment in services and financial services is covered by both FTA and bilateral agreements, the non-services area is regulated exclusively by bilateral investment agreements.
• The principle of non-discrimination of NT is safeguarded twofold for all three areas (by FTA and bilateral agreements).
• The MFN principle is applied by the bilateral agreements.
• Capital and profit transfers are also safeguarded twofold through BITs and FTA for all three areas.
• The possibility for investor-to-state disputes (post-establishment) has been assured by investors and corporations through the BITs.
• The possibilities for trade-related disputes between states are regulated by the BITs.
• The regulation concerning services and public procurement is realized by the FTA.
• And additionally, in foreign trade-related issues the rules of “non-discrimination”? of the WTO apply.
Through this kind of crossing and mutually amending treaties of BITs, FTAs and WTO everything is subjected to the free play of the market. An extension of investors rights without obligations or conditions goes hand in hand with a restriction and elimination of national margins of action with respect to regional development programs or conditions for investors, certain performance requirements like a minimum quotas on national employees or conditions to promote regional development like the preferential treatment of local suppliers, all of which is prohibited by the joint-play of BITs, FTA and WTO. It is unclear which democratic margins of actions will be retained by governments apart from leaving everything to the market criteria of price and efficiency, without room for national, regional or local decision-making.
Environmental, social and human rights are at least mentioned in the FTAs of the EU, but only in so far that the verbal commitment to human rights and the rule of law appears in the introductory clause, without specifying any concrete measures to condition and supervise the compliance with these principles. Investors’ rights are clearly the focus of these treaties, investors’ obligations are not mentioned. EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy has characterized the EU-Chile agreement as
“a XXI century model of trade relations. The ambitious and innovative provisions are expected to deliver considerable economic and commercial benefits”? [328], especially in the area of services and investment it goes much further than the existing WTO-commitments. [329]
It can be agreed with the judgement of Klaus Schilder from the NGO WEED regarding the FTAs of the EU, who states that:

“The EU its striving to anchor broad concessions to international investors in the treaty (as, e.g., legal guarantees to protect foreign investors, a MFN clause, protection against expropriation and nationalization, free transfer of profits as well as an international dispute settlement mechanism). The European Parliament has already spoken out in 1999 for the adoption of a legally binding code of conduct for foreign investors in developing countries in the annex of future agreements, which would obligate investors to comply with social, human rights and environmental minimum standards. Some of the new EU trade agreements tend to grant broader protection of investment as previously accorded in other multilateral initiatives. Overall it therefore has to be feared, that beyond the WTO-framework the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI), which was believed to be dead, could be revive through the backdoor through bilateral and regional treaties.”? [330]

5.3 The EU-MERCOSUR association agreement: The deregulation of national markets through the regulation of international markets?
The EU and MERCOSUR, after the “failure”? of Cancún, have repeatedly emphasized their interest in finalizing an “Interregional Association Agreement”?. A conclusion to this agreement – with the “ambitious and innovative provisions”? of the so-called “fourth generation”? – will now, after the EU-Mexico and EU-Chile agreements, be attempted within the EU-MERCOSUR context in the course of the coming months.
Following the last EU-MERCOSUR ministerial meeting in Brussels on November 12, 2003 the negotiation plan of the coming sessions of the bi-regional negotiation committee (BNC) was tightened, so that the treaty will be prepared for the final consultations at the next meeting of the heads of state of Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe from May 28-29 at Guadalajara, Mexico, and could be signed, according to the plan, in October 2004.
The issue of investment will play a central role here, which will have to be matched by the pretensions of the European Commission, which untiringly praises the compatibility of trade and investment with development. But so far the focus of the EU-MERCOSUR negotiation process seems to have favored trade and investment, so that the warning of the assessment expressed by civil society already in 2002 continues to be valid:
“It is time to rethink the process of international investment agreements thoroughly. In particular the relationship between bilateral investment agreements and multilateral or interregional agreements needs to be articulated much more carefully and explicitly than has happened to date. That does not appear to be happening within the EU/MERCOSUR process.”? [331]
It not only has to be feared that, within the framework of the broad free trade agenda between the EU and MERCOSUR questions of development will become secondary just like the verbal avowals for human rights, but also that national scope of decision making with respect to development will be subjected to the dictum of profit and efficiency by means of the
a) Proposed free trade agreement.
b) Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with their far-reaching investors’ rights, which have already been ratified or are near to ratification.
c) The still pending Doha “Development”? Round of the WTO.
d) The allocation of public goods through respective regulations in the sectoral GATS agreement.
e) And the area of public procurement as a horizontal topic in the framework of the WTO and the FTAs and especially
f) The issue of investment, likewise a horizontal topic of international trade regimes.
It is all about the bipolarity of regulation and deregulation: The deregulation of the national market by the regulation of international trade regimes. In this way, in the context of the interweaving of international treaties between MERCOSUR and the European Union, a completely deregulated market would have again prepared the ideal ground for cross-border profit maximization and the commercialization of all thinkable spheres, by putting trade on a legal basis through the double or triple safeguard of international treaties. The free play of the market will solve it all, as if the sum of market-induced egoisms would in fact lead to an increased welfare for society as a whole.

References

· “Argentina”?, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, Jun. 2003
· “Brazil - Letter of Intent”?, November 21, 2003, http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2003/bra/04/index.htm
· “Brazil”?, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, June 2003
· “Paraguay”?, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, October 2003
· “Uruguay”?, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, Jun. 2003
· ACUERDO DE COOPERACION INTERINSTITUCIONAL ENTRE EL MERCADO COMUN DEL SUR Y LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, Santiago de Chile, May 29, 1992
· Agência Brasil, September 5, 2003
· Agência Brasil, September 9, 2003
· Agência Brasil, September 19, 2003
· Agência Brasil, October 10, 2003
· AHK Brasil / Ernst&Young: So geht’s...Besteuerungen von Unternehmen in Brasilien, 1.ed. 2003
· Alteração à Lei do Capital Estrangeiro LEI Nº 4.390, DE 29 DE AGÔSTO DE 1964
· Amazonia.org.br, September 2, 2003
· Amércia Economia: Ranking 500, July 4-31, 2003
· Arroyo Picard, Alberto: Dürftige Bilanz. Was haben acht Jahre NAFTA/TLCAN Mexico gebracht, in: ila N°260, November 2002
· Arroyo, Picard Alberto (UAM / ASC, México): Experiencias mejicanas con el TLCAN, in: FDCL-Tagungsgreader: Die grosse Freihandelszone Amerika (ALCA): Herausforderungen und Alternativen, Berlin 2003
· B2B Magazine, Okt. 22, 2003
· BBC World News, November 18, 2003
· BDI-Pressemitteilung, April 29, 2003
· Birchal, Sérgio Oliveira: European Direct Investment in Brazil, 1969-2000
· Bithiah de Azevedo, Déborah: Os acordos para a promoção e a proteção recíproca de investimentos assinados pelo Brasil, Consultoria Legislativa, Câmara dos Deputados, May 2001
· Boss, Daniel: Wettlauf mit den USA. Deutsche Wirtschaftsbeamte sehen einer möglichen gesamtamerikanischen Freihandelszone mit Unbehagen entgegen, in: ila N°260, November 15, 2002
· Calvo, Carlos: Derecho Internacional teórico y práctico de Europa y Amércia, Paris 1868
· CAP”?TULO III, DA POL”?TICA AGR”?COLA E FUNDI”?RIA E DA REFORMA AGR”?RIA, Art. 184
· Catalano, José: Las negociaciones Mercosur-Unión Europea: una visión desde la sociedad civil, vorläufige Version, December 2002
· CEPAL: La inversión extranjera en América Latina y el Caribe, 2002, Santiago de Chile: March 2003
· Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament, and to the Economic and Social Committee: Reviving the DDA Negotiations - the EU Perspective, Brussels, November 26, 2003
· CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, Art.9
· Das Parlament, Nr. 16 - 17 April 13.-20., 2001
· DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, Jun. 2003
· dpa/afx, October 22, 2003
· Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part
· El País, Uruguay, October 31, 2003
· El País, Uruguay, December 10., 2003
· Estado de São Paulo, October 8, 1999
· Estado de São Paulo, November 30, 2002
· Estado de São Paulo Jun.25, 2003
· Estado de São Paulo August 20, 2003
· Estado de São Paulo September 20, 2003
· Estado de São Paulo, November 17, 2003
· Estado de São Paulo November 18, 2003
· Estado de São Paulo, December 3, 2003
· Estado de São Paulo, December 11, 2003
· Estado de São Paulo, December 2, 2003.
· EU-Chile Association Agreement, November 18., 2002
· Folha de São Paulo, Jun. 4, 1999
· Folha de São Paulo, July 8, 2003
· Folha de São Paulo, July 15, 2003
· Folha de São Paulo, November 2, 2003
· Folha de São Paulo, December 2, 2003.
· Fritz, Thomas: Die letzte Grenze. GATS: Die Dienstleistungsverhandlungen in der WTO. Sachstand, Probleme, Alternativen. Eine kritische Einführung von Thomas Fritz, Berlin: WEED, February 2003
· FT, September 22., 2003
· FTD, November 13, 2003
· FTD, November 24, 2003
· FTD, December 22, 2003
· GATS 2000. Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil
· Gazeta Mercantil, December 9., 2003
· Gazeta Mercantil, November 11, 2003
· Gazeta Mercantil, October 13, 2003
· Gould, Ellen: A Posição do Brasil nas Negociações do GATS (Acordo Geral sobre Comércio de Serviços), see http://www.rebrip.org.br/publique/media/Ellen%20Gould.doc
· Gratius, Susanne: Spielt Europa in Lateinamerika noch eine Rolle?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (B 38-39/2003)
· Handelsblatt, August 27, 2002
· Handelsblatt: Die Logik der Zahlungsbilanz, March 13, 1997
· Hartmann, Eva / Scherrer, Christoph: Negotiations on Trade in Services - The Positions of the Trade Unions on GATS, ed. Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Occasional Papers N°6, Genf, May 2003
· Hochuli, Marianne: Investment agreements as one-sided enforcement of investors rights I: From Bilateral Investment Agreements to NAFTA to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), Berne Declaration, Switzerland, October 2002
· http://193.194.138.190/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.2002.11.En?Opendocument
· http://ambientebrasil.com.br
· http://an.uol.com.br/2003/jan/28/0eco.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla198_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/development/mission_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/chile/assoc_agr/ip02_1696.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/com95_216_en.pdf
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/index.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#4
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/bacground_doc/fca96.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/intro
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_422.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/gentools/glossarycont_en.htm#gsp
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/docs/euchlagr_i.pdf
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/mercosur/pr140703_de.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/index_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/past.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/underway.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/underway.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/pr220903_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/pr051103_de.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/gov_proc/index_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/gov_proc/index_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/index_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/memo101103_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/pr101103_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/investment/conswtoag_inv.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/services/index_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/sia/pr060203_en.htm
· http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_276/l_27620001028en00450061.pdf
· http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/de/cig/g4000g.htm#g6
· http://mebf.arcelor.com/about.htm
· http://mebf.arcelor.com/pdf/EU_reaction_Rio.pdf
· http://mebf.arcelor.com/pdf/MEBF_Rio_Declaration.pdf
· http://mebf.arcelor.com/rio.htm
· http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/D/1776-1800/foreignpolicy/jay.htm#I
· http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/111832.htm
· http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/114120.htm
· http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/europa/2001newround/nr.pdf
· http://www.abtc.org.br/info.php?codigo=1902
· http://www.agbar.es/eng/nt/ntea001.htm
· http://www.aguasargentinas.com.ar/frameset_aguas.html
· http://www.arevagroup.com
· http://www.asc-hsa.org
· http://www.aussenwirtschaft.info/content/publikationen/AWJB_19.pdf
· http://www.aussenwirtschaft.info/content/publikationen/AWJB_19.pdf
· http://www.banespa.com.br/site/servicos/institucional/sn_gruposantander_historia.jsp
· http://www.bauernverband.de/konkret_916.html
· http://www.bauernverband.de/pressemitteilung_988.html
· http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/09/030911_casssuca2mp.shtml
· http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/09/030923_volksvale.shtml
· http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/10/031016_mckinseymla.shtml
· http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/10/031016_mckinseymla.shtml
· http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/11/031112_amorimcmmla.shtml
· http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/11/031119_naftamla.shtml
· http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2002/021004_baerrg.shtml
· http://www.bdi-online.de/RedDot/Protokoll_final_version_2003.pdf
· http://www.bdi-online.de/schwerpunkte_daten/handelspolitische_schutzinstrumente.htm
· http://www.bmz.de/presse/reden/rede20020614.html
· http://www.cancun2003.org/es/web/101.html
· http://www.cege.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/Veranstaltungen/antrittsvorlstoll.pdf
· http://www.citizen.org/
· http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7076
· http://www.developmentgoals.org/
· http://www.dgmarket.com/eproc/eu/547690
· http://www.elementischromium.com/pdf/042104SDS-008.pdf
· http://www.elpais.com.uy/Suple/AmericaDelSur/03/06/30/spas_latin_48451.asp
· http://www.encontrobrasilalemanha.com.br/
· http://www.endesa.es/english/index.html
· http://www.estadao.com.br/economia/noticias/2003/out/03/79.htm
· http://www.estado.com.br/editorias/2002/11/30/eco021.html
· http://www.estado.com.br/editorias/2003/09/26/eco043.html
· http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/06/28/eco022.html
· http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/07/14/eco038.html
· http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/07/14/eco038.html
· http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/10/27/eco036.html
· http://www.eu-kommission.de/pdf/eunachrichten/12_INTERNET.pdf
· http://www.foe.org/
· http://www.framatome.com/
· http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View_e.asp
· http://www.ftd.de/tm/tk/1055066659117.html?nv=sl
· http://www.ftd.de/ub/fi/1039964401475.html?nv=rs
· http://www.ftd.de/ub/fi/1039964401475.html?nv=rs
· http://www.ftd.de/ub/in/1065243029175.html?nv=se
· http://www.ftd.de/ub/in/1067066343667.html?nv=sl
· http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
· http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
· http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf, dort S.16
· http://www.gruposantander.com/pagina/indice/0,,412_1_2,00.html
· http://www.guardian.co.uk/euro/story/0,11306,1004606,00.html
· http://www.handel-entwicklung-menschenrechte.org/fileadmin/christian/Chile-EU-AssociationAgreement.pdf
· http://www.handel-entwicklung-menschenrechte.org/fileadmin/christian/E-CN.4-Sub.2-2002-9.pdf
· http://www.hemscott.co.uk/equities/company/cd02043.htm
· http://www.herbertboesch.at/content/content.php?ID=361
· http://www.ibero-amerikaverein.de/
· http://www.ibero-amerikaverein.de/
· http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/intro_court/introduction.asp
· http://www.iconebrasil.org.br/index_01.asp
· http://www.igmetall.de/pressedienst/2002/074.html
· http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2003/bra/04/index.htm
· http://www.irn.org/programs/biobio/
· http://www.ixpos.de/frameset.htm?content=http://www.ixpos.de/news/meldungen/BDI105.html?prevHome=1
· http://www.labournet.de/branchen/auto/vw/allg/sozialcharta.pdf
· http://www.labournet.de/branchen/auto/vw/allg/sozialcharta.pdf
· http://www.lateinamerika-konferenz.de/
· http://www.localglobal.de/lak/vortraege/Forum_Kaup.pdf
· http://www.mebf.bdi-online.de/reddot/lai.htm
· http://www.menschen-recht-wasser.de/downloads/4_2_un_comment.pdf
· http://www.menschen-recht-wasser.de/menschenrecht-wasser/vereinte-nationen.php
· http://www.mercosur-info.com/al/index.shtml
· http://www.mercosur-info.com/al/index.shtml
· http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/nafta/chap-111.htm
· http://www.n-tv.de/3173891.html
· http://www.ogb-l.lu/pdf/communiques/12/Eurostat_240703.pdf
· http://www.paulogarciapt.com/acervo.asp?materia=2100
· http://www.paulogarciapt.com/acervo.asp?materia=2100
· http://www.radiobras.gov.br/materia.phtml?materia=136662&editoria=EC
· http://www.rebrip.org.br
· http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,275552,00.html
· http://www.un.org/millennium/
· http://www.uncitral.org/
· http://www.unglobalcompact.org/content/AboutTheGC/TheNinePrinciples/prin3.htm
· http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp
· http://www.uno.de/sg/millennium/ziele/
· http://www.urgewald.de
· http://www.ustr.gov/new/zero_tariff-presentation.ppt
· http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-09-22-ft.htm
· http://www.vermelho.org.br/diario/2003/1025/1025_banespa.asp
· http://www.vermelho.org.br/diario/2003/1029/1029_bancarios-sp.asp
· http://www.weed-online.org/artikel/18513.html
· http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/Furlan%20Luiz%20Fernando?open
· http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
· http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm
· http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/uruguay.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf
· http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm#248_259_abr
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_chair_speaking_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#organization
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#relationship
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey6_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact0_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm
· http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm
· Igler, Wolfgang / Schekulin, Manfred: Von Havanna bis Doha: der lange Weg zu multilateralen Investitionsregeln
· ila 268: out of control. Transnationale Konzerne und die Menschenrechte, Bonn: September 2003
· International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966,entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27
· INTERREGIONAL FRAMEWORK CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT, Official Journal L 069, 19/03/1996 p. 0004 - 0022 - L 112 29/04/1999 P. 0066, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/bacground_doc/fca96.htm
· Jost, Thomas / Nunnenkamp, Peter: Bestimmungsgründe deutscher Direktinvestitionen in Entwicklungs- und Reformländern - Hat sich wirklich etwas verändert?, Kieler Arbeitspapier Nr.1124, August 2002
· Küppers, Gaby: Es darf geschröpft werden. Das EU-Chile-Abkommen ist unter Dach und Fach, in: ila, N°260, November 2002
· Küppers, Gaby: It takes four to tango. Nach dem Tango-Effekt hat die EU die Verhandlungsspur mit dem Mercosur verloren, in: ila N°260
· Lamy, Pascal: IS THERE LIFE AFTER CANCUN ?, October 31, 2003
· Lamy, Pascal: Trade Crisis?, European Institute, Washington, November 4, 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla198_en.htm
· Lateinamerika Nachrichten: Das deutsch/brasilianische Bombengeschäft, Sondernummer der Lateinamerika Nachrichten, Berlin (West) 1980
· Le Monde Diplomatique: Die gewollte Ausbreitung von Round Ready. Brasiliens Exportschlager Soja und der Gentechkonzern Monsanto, December 12, 2003
· LEI Nº 4.131, DE 3 DE SETEMBRO DE 1962, Art.2°
· Les Echos, September 12, 2002
· Ling, Martin: Lateinamerika im Visier der Europäischen Union. Europa wetteifert mit den USA um den Markt der wiederentdeckten “Neuen Welt”?, in: Lateinamerika Nachrichten N° 349/350, Berlin: July /August 2003
· Mann, Howard (IISD): Who owns “your”? water? Reclaiming water as a public good under international trade and investment law, IISD, August 2003
· Manuel Ramos, Maria / Ribeiro, José Félix: O Investimento Directo Espanhol: da América Latina para a Europa Continental
· Mello, Fátima (FASE / Rebrip) / Fatheuer, Thomas (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Rio de Janeiro): Zwischen WTO und ALCA - Brasilien auf der Suche nach neuen Wegen, 2003
· Mello, Fátima (FASE/Rebrip): SERVIÇOS PARA QUEM PRECISA? As negociações de serviços no GATS e na ALCA, July 2002
· Mercopress, November 11, 2003
· Mercosur/European Union Business Forum: Brasilia Declaration, Brasília, October 2003
· Moltke, Konrad von (International Institute for Sustainable Development): European Union / Mercosur Negotiations. The Environment and Sustainable Development Dimension, hrsg. v. WWF European Policy Office, Belgien & WWF Brazil, April 2002
· NfA, December 9, 2003
· NOGUEIRA BATISTA JR., Paulo (USP / FGV-EAESP): DIRETO AO PONTO, in: Agência Carta Maior, December 16, 2003
· Nohlen, Dieter (Hrsg.): Lexikon Dritte Welt, 10.ed., 1998
· Nunnenkamp, Peter: Foreign Direct Investment in Mercosur: The Strategies of European Investors, in: Giordano, Paolo (Chaire Mercosur de Sciences Po) [edit.]: An Integrated Approach to the European Union - Mercosur Association, 2002
· Peterson, Luke Eric (International Institute for Sustainable Development - IISD): Research Note: Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development, August 2003
· Peterson, Luke Eric: BIT Cases going to Swedish Arbitration Institute. Volume and Details Remain Elusive, Jun.13, 2003
· Peterson, Luke Eric: Brazil Remains Wary of International Investment Rules, in: INVEST-SD, Jun.1, 2003
· Peterson, Luke Eric: Research Note: Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development, Invest-SD News Bulletin, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), August 2003
· Portella de Castro, Maria Silvia: Mercosul e União Européia: relações econômicas e comercias e as negociações do Acordo de Cooperação Inter-Regional, January 2003
· Pressemitteilung des Deutschen Bauernverbandes, siehe http://www.bauernverband.de/pressemitteilung_988.html
· Protokoll der XXX. Sitzung der Deutsch-Brasilianischen Gemischten Wirtschaftskommission / REPORT OF THE 2003 GERMAN-BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC MEETING (XXX MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND XXI ENTREPRENEURIAL MEETING), see http://www.ibero-amerikaverein.de/
· Republic of Chile: Investment and Transparency Provisions in Chile’s FTAs with the E.U. and U.S.A. Presentation before the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on April 10, 2003
· RESOLUÇÃO Nº 2883 de 30 de JULHO de 2001
· Rösler, Peter: “Freihandel EU-Mercosur und FTAA bedroht”?, http://www.ibero-amerikaverein.de/
· Rösler, Peter: Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-Amerika Verein der Deutschen Wirtschaft, July 30, 2003
· Sauter, Hermann: Sozialstandards im Globalisierungsprozess. Inhalt und Durchsetzungsmöglichkeiten, Enquete-Kommission “Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft. Herausfordeungen und Antworten”?, AU Stud 14/10, Deutscher Bundestag
· Schilder, Klaus (WEED): Regionalisierung unter neoliberalem Vorzeichen? Die polit-ökonomische Geographie der EU-Handelspolitik Jun.10, 2003, http://www.weed-online.org/artikel/18513.html
· Schmidt, Gerold: México, campeón mundial de los tratados de libre comercio con contradicciones internas. La apertura total hacia los EUA y el mercado mundial de poco le sirve a las mayorías, http://www.cancun2003.org/es/web/101.html
· SICHERHEITSDATENBLATT, Dokument Nr. SDS-08, Ausgabe 009, EC NR. 215-607-8, Jun.30, 2002, see: http://www.elementischromium.com/pdf/042104SDS-008.pdf
· Souza, Paulo Renato: Post-Secondary Education and Opportunities for Investment and Trade
· Stoll, Peter-Tobias: Globalisierung und Legitimation, Göttingen, May 19, 2003, p. 4, see: http://www.cege.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/Veranstaltungen/antrittsvorlstoll.pdf
· Strickner, Alexandra (TIP/IATP Geneva): Trade Talks remain stalled as major powers show no flexibility. Trade negotiating bodies to be reestablished early next year, December 18, 2003
· Tawil, Guido Santiago (M.& M.Bomchil, Buenos Aires): Investor-State-Arbitration : A hot issue in Latin America, 2002
· Torrelli, Claudia: Mercosur for sale? The EU’s FTAA and the need to oppose it. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) & Transnational Institute (TNI), Info Brief, Amsterdam, August 2003
· Torrent, Ramón: Acordos Internacionais. O capítulo XI do Nafta e as negociações da Alca: a bone thrown to the dogs? A verdadeira história das negociações do Acordo Multilateral de Investimentos - AMI ainda não foi escrita, in: Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior, FUNCEX N° 74, January-March 2003
· Toscano, Idalvo : As Contas CC-5: um caso particular de flexibilização do mercado cambial, in: Gonçalves, Reinaldo / França, Cristina / Toscano, Idalvo: O Brasil nas negociações internacionais de serviços e investimentos, Revista Argumento: Inesc, October 2002
· United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): FDI and Development: The Case of Privatization-related Services FDI: Trends, Impact and Policy Issues, TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2, September 12, 2003
· United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): FDI AND DEVELOPMENT: The case of privatization-related services, TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2
· United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives, New York/Genf 2003
· United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Resolution 2003/9: Human rights, trade and investment, July 2, 2003
· Urgewald e.V. Presseerklärung: Deutsch-brasilianische Infrastrukturinitiative nachhaltig ausgestalten. Brasilianische Umweltschützer fordern deutsche Investoren auf: Hände weg von riskanten Infrastrukturprojekten!, Berlin Jun.2, 2003, http://www.urgewald.de
· Valor Econômico, October 16, 2003
· Valor Econômico, October 17, 2003
· Valor Econômico, October 28, 2003
· Valor Econômico, October 29, 2003
· Valor Econômico, November 18, 2003
· Valor Econômico, December 2, 2003
· Zoellick, Robert B.: America will not wait for the won’t-do countries, in: FT, September 22, 2003, S.23, see: http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-09-22-ft.htm

Footnotes:

1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/MERCOSUR/intro
2 http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View_e.asp
3 This view is also reflected by the analysis of the Hemispheric Social Alliance - Alianza Social Continental - Aliança Social
Continental at http://www.asc-hsa.org, or also the Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos Rebrip: http://www.rebrip.org.br
4 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm
5 http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/europa/2001newround/nr.pdf
6 http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/europa/2001newround/nr.pdf
7 http://www.ustr.gov/new/zero_tariff-presentation.ppt
8 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#organization
9 "Mercosul faz acordo para combater barreiras: O uso crescente de normas técnicas para restringir o acesso de produtos
importados levou os países do Mercosul a firmarem um acordo, ontem, para defenderem, em bloco, os interesses de
exportadores brasileiros, argentinos, paraguaios e uruguaios, contra exigências ambientais, de saúde ou outro tipo de barreira
burocrática não previsto em tratados" Valor Econômico 2.12.2003. Own translation: „The MERCOSUR agrees on combating
barriers: the increasing use of technical norms to restrict the access of imported goods took the MERCOSUR countries to sign
an agreement yesterday against environmental-, health- or other types of bureaucratical barriers which are not mentioned in the
treaties.”
10 See, e.g., Das Parlament, No. 16 – 17, April 13/20, 2001.
11 „Paraguay”, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels October 2003.
12 Argentina, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels June 2003.
13 „Uruguay”, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels June 2003.
14 „Brazil”, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels June 2003.
15 Own translation of the following original text: „Während die Abkommen die Entwicklungsländer zwingen, ihre Märkte
weitgehend für EU-Produkte zu öffnen, bestehen gerade für viele der in der EU produzierten landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnisse
weiterhin hohe Zollschranken für Einfuhren aus dem Süden. Die Freihandelsabkommen mit Südafrika, Mexiko und Chile
sehen darüber hinaus eine Sicherheitsklausel für den Fall vor, daß ein sprunghaftes Ansteigen der Handelsflüsse einen Sektor
oder die gesamtökonomische Situation eines Partners bedroht - de facto eine Hintertür der EU, um ihre Märkte für den Fall
einer erfolgreichen Exportsteigerung eines südlichen Partners vorübergehend zu schließen.”Taken from Schilder, Klaus
(WEED): Regionalisierung unter neoliberalem Vorzeichen? Die polit-ökonomische Geographie der EU-Handelspolitik
10.06.2003, http://www.weed-online.org/artikel/18513.html
16 The Brazilian Secretary of Agriculture repeatedly defines the agricultural sector as a priority: „primazia da questão
agrícola”, see, e.g.,: http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/11/031112_amorimcmmla.shtml
17 "Überdies hat die einflussreiche Grundbesitzerlobby mit Agrarminister Roberto Rodrigues einen wichtigen Mann in der
Regierung. Der ehemalige Präsident des brasilianischen Agribusiness-Verbands besitzt im nordöstlichen Bundesstaat
Maranhão selbst eine 4 000 Hektar große Sojaplantage." Le Monde Diplomatique: Die gewollte Ausbreitung von Round
Ready. Brasiliens Exportschlager Soja und der Gentechkonzern Monsanto, 12.12.2003. Own translation: „Furthermore, the
influential big landowners’ lobby has an important man in the government: The Secretary of Agriculture, Roberto Rodrigues.
The former president of the Brazilian agribusiness-association himself owns a large soya-plantation of 4000 hectares in the
northeastern state of Maranhão.”
18 Own translation of the following original text: „[i]nsbesondere das Landwirtschafts- und Entwicklungsministerium gelten
als Hochburgen der ALCA-Apologeten, weil hier die Lobbyisten der Industrie (Agribusiness, Stahl, Textilien), die sich von
einer Freihandelszone Vorteile versprechen, über großen Einfluß verfügen.”Taken from: Fátima V.Mello (FASE / Rebrip)/
Thomas Fatheuer (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Rio de Janeiro): Zwischen WTO und ALCA – Brasilien auf der Suche nach neuen
Wegen, 2003.
19 „Itamaraty perde um pouco de autonomia na Alca”, Valor Econômico 17.10.2003.
20 See, e.g., the following institution financed by the Brazilian agricultural exporters: „Instituto de Estudos do Comércio e
Negociações Internacionais”(ICONE), http://www.iconebrasil.org.br/index_01.asp
21 Estado de São Paulo, December 11th of 2003
22 http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/Furlan%20Luiz%20Fernando?open
23 "Os europeus temem uma posição futura mais radical do Brasil junto à OMC na questão das duas queixas relacionadas com
frangos, porque, segundo fontes comunitárias, a UE "não pode desconsiderar que faz parte do governo atual um grande
empresário do setor", referindo-se a Furlan, um dos sócios da Sadia", http://an.uol.com.br/2003/jan/28/0eco.htm Own
translation: “The Europeans fear a more radical position of Brazil together with the WTO in the future, regarding the issue of
the two complaints related to chicken, because, according to sources of the EU, the EU “cannot neglect that a big businessman
of the sector forms part of the current government,”? referring to Furlan, one of the two associates of Sadia.”?
24 Agência Brasil, Sep. 5, 2003:" Brasil recorre à OMC contra sobretaxa da UE ao frango. A Câmara de Comércio Exterior
(Camex) decidiu hoje pedir a abertura de um painel na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) contra a União Européia
(UE) para questionar a sobretaxa aplicada ao frango salgado produzido no Brasil. Tanto o governo quanto os exportadores
brasileiros discordam da atitude da UE de aumentar de 15% para 75% a taxa cobrada sobre todo frango congelado salgado
vendido ao mercado europeu. Anteriormente, a nomenclatura comercial européia admitia uma taxa de 15% para todo o frango
salgado exportado pelo Brasil. Percebendo isto, os exportadores brasileiros de frango passaram a adicionar sal na ave." Own
translation: “Brazil resorts to the WTO against the EU import-tariffs on poultry. The Foreign Trade Chamber (Camex) decided
today to ask for the opening of a panel at the WTO against the European Union, to question the import-tariffs imposed on
salted chicken produced in Brazil. The government and the exporters disagree with the attidtude of the EU to augment from
15% to 75% the import-tariff imposed on all frozen salted chicken sold to the European market. Before the European
commercial legislation admitted a tariff of 15% on all salted poultry exported by Brazil. Confronted with this situation, the
Brazilian exporters had passed to add salt to their poultry.”?
25 Gazeta Mercantil, Oct. 13, 2003, und Gazeta Mercantil, Nov. 11, 2003.
26 Gazeta Mercantil, Dec. 9, 2003.
27 Konrad von Moltke (International Institute for Sustainable Development): European Union / MERCOSUR Negotiations.
The Environment and Sustainable Development Dimension, edited by WWF European Policy Office, Belgium & WWF
Brazil, April 2002, p. 5.
28Own translation of the following original text: "Der Deutsche Bauernverband hält im Zuge der unaufhaltsamen
Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft verbindliche Spielregeln auch im Agrarhandel für notwendig. Bei fairen
Wettbewerbsbedingungen sieht er wirtschaftliche Chancen auf den internationalen Märkten für die deutschen und
europäischen Bauern, sowie für die Bauern in allen Teilen der Welt, insbesondere auch in den Entwicklungsländern.
Deutschland ist schon heute einer der größten Importeure von landwirtschaftlichen Rohprodukten und Nahrungsmitteln. Die
deutsche Agrarwirtschaft nimmt aber auch selbst am internationalen Handel teil.
Der Deutsche Bauernverband tritt für Handelsregeln ein, die allen Ländern der Welt vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener
Entwicklungsstufen und Wertvorstellungen sowie ausgeprägter Unterschiede bei den natürlichen und klimatischen
Bedingungen eine eigenständige Landwirtschaftspolitik ermöglichen, die aber gleichzeitig möglichst nicht handelsverzerrend
ist." Taken from: http://www.bauernverband.de/konkret_916.html
29 Cited from the press statement of the German Farmers’s Association, see:
http://www.bauernverband.de/pressemitteilung_988.html
30 Maria Silvia Portella de Castro: Mercosul e União Européia: relações econômicas e comercias e as negociações do Acordo
de Cooperação Inter-Regional, January 2003, p.15.
31 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_422.htm
32 Susanne Gratius: Spielt Europa in Lateinamerika noch eine Rolle?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (B 38-39/2003).
33 In the EU member countries the percentage varies substantially: In 2000, for example, Denmark spent 1.06%; the
Netherlands 0.84%, Sweden 0.8% and Luxemburg 0.71% of their GDP in public development programs, while the share in
Germany was only 0.22%; 0.2% in Greece and 0.13% in Italy. OECD, January 2000, see: Tabelle Öffentliche
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (ODA) www.eu-kommission.de/pdf/eunachrichten/12_INTERNET.pdf
34 Konrad von Moltke (International Institute for Sustainable Development): European Union / MERCOSUR Negotiations.
The Environment and Sustainable Development Dimension, edited by the WWF European Policy Office, Belgium & WWF
Brazil, April 2002, p. 4.
35 Konrad von Moltke (International Institute for Sustainable Development): European Union / MERCOSUR Negotiations.
The Environment and Sustainable Development Dimension, edited by the WWF European Policy Office, Belgium & WWF
Brazil, April 2002, p. 11.
36 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/index.htm
37 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/com95_216_en.pdf
38 Own translation of the following original text: „So ist zu befürchten, dass die EU Menschenrechts- und Demokratiefragen
nicht zum zentralen Anliegen der Abkommen macht, sondern vielmehr ihren wirtschaftlichen Freihandelsinteressen
unterordnet.“Taken from: Schilder, Klaus (WEED): Regionalisierung unter neoliberalem Vorzeichen? Die polit-ökonomische
Geographie der EU-Handelspolitik 10.06.2003, downloaded from: http://www.weed-online.org/artikel/18513.html
39 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#4
40 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its
Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, p. 2, see: http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/
pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_276/l_27620001028en00450061.pdf
41 EU-Chile Association Agreement, Nov. 18, 2002, p. 3,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/docs/euchlagr_i.pdf
42 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/index_en.htm
43http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/past.htm and
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/underway.htm
44 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/sia/underway.htm
45 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/sia/pr060203_en.htm
46 Konrad von Moltke (International Institute for Sustainable Development): European Union / MERCOSUR Negotiations.
The Environment and Sustainable Development Dimension, hrsg. v. WWF European Policy Office, Belgien & WWF Brazil,
April 2002, p. 24.
47 The Guardian reported: "The commission froze all contracts with Planistat two weeks ago as part of a crackdown on
"widespread irregularities" in Eurostat, which Neil Kinnock, the commission's vice-president, said gave rise to >deep
concerns<." http://www.guardian.co.uk/euro/story/0,11306,1004606,00.html
48 Own translation of the following quote taken from: http://www.ogb-l.lu/pdf/communiques/12/Eurostat_240703.pdf : “...die
die Erstellung von Sozialplänen nicht die Lösung sein kann, um die Fehler der EU-Kommission auszubügeln.”
49 http://www.herbertboesch.at/content/content.php?ID=361
50 http://www.dgmarket.com/eproc/eu/547690
51 Own translation of the following original text: „Im Sommer [2002, Anm. d.A.] wurde das Zwischenergebnis [der SIA EUChile,
Anm.d.A.] vor eingeladenen VertreterInnen der so genannten Zivilgesellschaft in Brüssel vorgestellt. Dabei wies der
anwesende Kommissionsvertreter die VerfasserInnen des SIA an, in der Endfassung die Seiten mit Angaben über erwartbare
Arbeitsplatzverluste herauszunehmen.
Während der besagten EP-Chile-Parlamentssitzung wurde die Kommission darauf angesprochen – und leugnete wider
Erwarten den peinlichen Zwischenfall nicht. Die ausgewiesenen Jobverluste seien gering, war die Erläuterung, und bei
Zukunftsberechnungen gäbe es immer mal wieder solche Ergebnisse, die von der Realität nicht bestätigt würden.”Taken from:
Küppers, Gaby: Es darf geschröpft werden. Das EU-Chile-Abkommen ist unter Dach und Fach, in: ila, No. 260, Nov. 2002, p.
33.
52 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/development/mission_en.htm
53 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_422.htma
54 Own translation of the following original text: "Auch innerhalb der EU ist unter dem Stichwort "Kohärenz" noch einiges zu
leisten. So gibt es immer noch drastische Widersprüche zwischen EU-Handelspolitik, EU-Agrarpolitik und EUEntwicklungspolitik."
Taken from: The German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie
Wieczorek-Zeul, at the Bundestag on June 14, 2002 in the debate on the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg 2002. Source: http://www.bmz.de/presse/reden/rede20020614.html
55 Konrad von Moltke (International Institute for Sustainable Development): European Union / MERCOSUR Negotiations.
The Environment and Sustainable Development Dimension, edited by the WWF European Policy Office, Belgium & WWF
Brazil, April 2002, p. 4.
56 Concerning these issues of negotiation-manoeuverings regarding the investment regulations in the framework of NAFTA
and FTAA also see: Ramón Torrent: Acordos Internacionais. O capítulo XI do Nafta e as negociações da Alca: a bone thrown
to the dogs? A verdadeira história das negociações do Acordo Multilateral de Investimentos - AMI ainda não foi escrita, in:
Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior, FUNCEX No. 74, Jan.-March 2003.
57 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for
Development: National and International Prespectives, New York/Geneva 2003, p. 231.
58Abbreviation: FDI-Flows.
59 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for
Development: National and International Prespectives, New York/Geneva 2003, p. 231.
60 Abbreviation: FDI-Stock.
61 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for
Development: National and International Prespectives, New York/Geneva 2003, p. 232.
62 See Financial Times Deutschland, http://www.ftd.de/ub/fi/1039964401475.html?nv=rs
63 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for
Development: National and International Prespectives, New York/Geneva 2003.
64 ibd., p. iii.
65 ibd., pp. 52.
66 ibd., p. iii.
67 See, e.g., http://www.uno.de/sg/millennium/ziele/, http://www.un.org/millennium/ or also
http://www.developmentgoals.org/
68 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for
Development: National and International Perspectives, New York/Geneva 2003, p. ii. [Accentuation made by the author.]
69 This refers to the McKinsey study which investigated the impact of governmental investment incentive programs in the
automobile sector, beginning in 1995, in Mexico, Brasil, China and India. See:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/10/031016_mckinseymla.shtml
70 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/10/031016_mckinseymla.shtml
71 "Nach einer Umfrage des Ifo-Instituts (ifo-Informationsdienst 16/96) stehen nämlich auch die Direktinvestitionen im
Ausland im Dienste des Exports. Über 90% der Auslandsstandorte sollen Vertrieb und Service, also den Export, fördern. [...]
Generell erfolgen die deutschen Direktinvestitionen im Ausland zum Zweck der Absatzsicherung und sichern somit die
Beschäftigung im Inland." Handelsblatt: Die Logik der Zahlungsbilanz, von Hans Mundorf, March 13, 1997, p. 6. Own translation: „According to a survey of the Ifo-Institute (ifo-Informationsdienst 16/96) direct investment made abroad mainly
serves exports. More than 90% of foreign locations are meant to promote sales and service, i.e., exports. [...]. Generally the
German foreign investment abroad serves the objective of assuring sales and therby also securing German employment.”
72 Gerold Schmidt: México, campeón mundial de los tratados de libre comercio con contradicciones internas. La apertura total
hacia los EUA y el mercado mundial de poco le sirve a las mayorías, http://www.cancun2003.org/es/web/101.html
73 http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/11/031119_naftamla.shtml, siehe auch: Folha se São Paulo: Nem
sol, nem lua, Dec. 2, 2003.
74 Own translation of the following original text: "nur 2,89 Prozent ihrer Produktionsbestandteile und Verpackungsmaterialien
in Mexico. Die mexikanische Manufaktur-Industrie hingegen, die nicht zur Maquila-Industrie gehört, hatte 1983 noch 91
Prozent der Produktionsbestandteile in Mexico gekauft, 1996 nur noch 37 Prozent. Dazu kommt, dass sich gerade in diesen
hochgradig auf den Export ausgerichteten Unternehmen die meisten Investitionen aus dem Ausland konzentrieren. Kurz: Wir
exportieren viel, aber das, was wir exportieren, ist nicht besonders mexikanisch .”Taken from: Arroyo Picard, Alberto:
Dürftige Bilanz. Was haben acht Jahre NAFTA/TLCAN Mexico gebracht, ila No. 260, Nov. 2002, p. 14.
75 op.cit., p. 15.
76 Own translation of the following original text: " unsicher und basieren auf Zeitverträgen, die Arbeitstage sind lang,
gewerkschaftliche Zusammenschlüsse werden mit starken und illegalen Druckmitteln verhindert. Außerdem sind diese
Arbeitsplätze hochgradig abhängig vom Wirtschaftskreislauf der USA. Von November 2000 bis März 2002 hatte die USA mit
schweren wirtschaftlichen Problemen zu kämpfen, und in der Maquila-Industrie sind 287 630 Arbeitsplätze verloren
gegangen, etwas weniger als die Hälfte der Jobs, die in den ersten sieben Jahren des TLCAN [NAFTA, Anm.A.] in diesem
Bereich neu entstanden waren."Taken from: op.cit., p. 15.
77 See http://www.handel-entwicklung-menschenrechte.org/fileadmin/christian/E-CN.4-Sub.2-2002-9.pdf
78 http://193.194.138.190/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.2002.11.En?Opendocument, also see: United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Resolution 2003/9: Human rights, trade and investment, July 2, 2003.
79 ila 268: out of control. Transnationale Konzerne und die Menschenrechte, Bonn: September 2003.
80 For the complete text of the treaty see http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/D/1776-1800/foreignpolicy/jay.htm#I
81 See Igler, Wolfgang / Schekulin, Manfred: Von Havanna bis Doha: der lange Weg zu multilateralen Investitionsregeln,
http://www.aussenwirtschaft.info/content/publikationen/AWJB_19.pdf
82 Hochuli, Marianne: Investment agreements as one-sided enforcement of investors rights I: From Bilateral Investment
Agreements to NAFTA to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), berne Declaration, Switzerland, Oct. 2002.
83 http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm
84 Doha-Ministerial Declaration of 2001 on the relationship of „trade and investment”.
85 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm
86 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm
87 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact0_e.htm
88 See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/de/cig/g4000g.htm#g6
89 See Fritz, Thomas: Die letzte Grenze. GATS: Die Dienstleistungsverhandlungen in der WTO. Sachstand, Probleme,
Alternativen. Eine kritische Einführung von Thomas Fritz, Berlin: WEED, February 2003, pp. 23
90 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm
91 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf
92 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm
93 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm
94 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey6_e.htm
95 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf
96 Also see Nohlen, Dieter (Ed.): Lexikon Dritte Welt, 10th edition, 1998.
97 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm
98 See Fritz, Thomas: Die letzte Grenze. GATS: Die Dienstleistungsverhandlungen in der WTO. Sachstand, Probleme,
Alternativen. Eine kritische Einführung von Thomas Fritz, Berlin: WEED, February 2003.
99 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm
100 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm
101 See Hartmann, Eva / Scherrer, Christoph: Negotiations on Trade in Services – The Positions of the Trade Unions on GATS,
ed. by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Occasional Papers No. 6, Geneva, May 2003, p. 12.
102 Ellen Gould: A Posição do Brasil nas Negociações do GATS (Acordo Geral sobre Comércio de Serviços), p. 2.
103 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm
104 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#relationship
105 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm
106 Bilateral investment treaties have contained this juridical construct for several years already.
107 http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/nafta/chap-111.htm
108 http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
109 http://www.uncitral.org/
110 Calvo, Carlos: Derecho Internacional teórico y práctico de Europa y Amércia, Paris 1868.
111 See, e.g.: Peterson, Luke Eric: Research Note: Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable
Development, Invest-SD News Bulletin, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Aug. 2003.
112 "Performance requirements" or "requisitos de desempeño" [sp.]
113 For the relationship between national and international trade legislation see, e.g.: Stoll, Peter-Tobias: Globalisierung und
Legitimation, Göttingen May 19th 2003, p. 4, downloaded from: http://www.cege.wiso.unigoettingen.
de/Veranstaltungen/antrittsvorlstoll.pdf
114 http://www.uncitral.org/
115 http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
116 http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/intro_court/introduction.asp
117 See Peterson, Luke Eric: Research Note: Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development,
Invest-SD News Bulletin, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Aug. 2003, p. 1.
118 For the special problem of the SCC see: Peterson, Luke Eric: BIT Cases going to Swedish Arbitration Institute. Volume
and Details Remain Elusive, 13.6.2003: „Research has revealed details of a handful of treaty-based claims which have gone to
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in recent years; an unclear number of other cases may be
pending, as there are no rules which mandate public disclosure of cases being arbitrated at the Institute, even where they may
involve challenges to government policies or measures in sensitive areas[...] In the absence of any mandatory rules on
disclosure of claims, however, the Stockholm option remains an attractive one for parties seeking to pursue arbitral claims
against host governments with a minimum of publicity.”
119 http://www.citizen.org/
120 http://www.foe.org/
121 http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7076
122Own translation of the following original text: „Unter Berücksichtigung der Reinvestitionen und der Investitionen über
Drittländer nimmt Deutschland mit einem Investitionsbestand von US$ 42 Mrd. nach den USA und Spanien den 3. Platz in der
Rangliste der Investitionspartner Lateinamerikas ein [...,ü]ber 85 % der deutschen Lateinamerika-Investitionen sind in der
verarbeitenden Industrie konzentriert [...] und das Produktionsvolumen der deutschen Tochterunternehmen in Lateinamerika
[überstieg] im Jahr 2001 mit ca. 65,3 Mrd den gesamten deutschen Export in die Region (ca 16 Mrd) um mehr als das
vierfache". Taken from: Rösler, Peter: Auslandsinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-Amerika Verein, July 30, 2003. For the
difference between reinvestment and investment flows, see: Rösler, Peter: Auslandsinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-
Amerika-Verein, July 30, 2003: "Reinvestitionen stehen an erster Stelle: Beim Ausbau des deutschen Engagements in
Lateinamerika spielt der Zufluß neuer Mittel aus Deutschland schon seit längerer Zeit nicht mehr die Hauptrolle. Viele
Lateinamerika-Töchter deutscher Unternehmen finanzieren die als notwendig erachteten Ersatz- oder Neuinvestitionen
weitgehend aus dem eigenen Cash-flow. In Brasilien und Mexiko ist deshalb inzwischen der Gesamtwert der Reinvestitionen
höher, als der kumulierte Direktinvestitionszufluß aus Deutschland. Allerdings werden in den offiziellen lateinamerikanischen
Statistiken die umfangreichen deutschen Reinvestitionen kaum berücksichtigt." Own translation: „Reinvestment is in first
place: Regarding the extension of German engagement in Latin America, the inflow of new funds has ceased to play a major
role a long time ago. Many Latin American subsidiaries of German companies finance the new or replacement investment
regarded as necessary through their own cash-flow. In Brasil and Mexico therefore in the meantime the total value of
reinvestment is higher than the accumulated inflow of direct investment from Germany. In the official Latin American
statistics, however, the broad German reinvestment is scarcely considered.”
123 http://www.localglobal.de/lak/vortraege/Forum_Kaup.pdf
124 Own translation of the following original text: "[d]ie deutschen Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika spielen eine
wichtigere Rolle, als anhand der Angaben zum Bestand der Direktinvestitionen erkennbar ist. Unabhängig von der Frage, wie
hoch die deutschen Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika tatsächlich sind, bleibt diese Region von strategischer Bedeutung für
die deutsche Wirtschaft. Außerhalb Westeuropas ist Lateinamerika die einzige Weltregion, in der deutsche Unternehmen
Schlüsselpositionen in bestimmten Industriesektoren innehaben. Beispiele dafür sind die Sektoren Kfz, Chemie, Pharmazie,
Elektrotechnik und Maschinenbau." Taken from Rösler, Peter: Auslandsinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-Amerika Verein,
July 30, 2003.
125 "So entfielen z.B. 2001 im Falle Deutschlands von den Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika und der Karibik auf Barbados
ca. 0,3 Mrd, auf die Bermudas ca. 3 Mrd, auf die Britischen Jungferninseln ca. 0,2 Mrd, auf die Kaiman-Inseln ca. 5,6 Mrd
und auf die Niederländischen Antillen ca. 1 Mrd. Auch die US-Unternehmen investierten nennenswerte Beträge in den
Steueroasen. 2002 wurden dort folgende US-Direktinvestitionsbestände registriert: Barbados US$ 1,5 Mrd, Bermuda US$
68,9 Mrd und andere Steueroasen US$ 29,3 Mrd. Insgesamt waren also die karibischen Steueroasen mit einem Drittel an den
deutschen und mit 37 % an den US-amerikanischen Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika und der Karibik beteiligt." Rösler,
Peter: Auslandsinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-Amerika Verein, July 30, 2003. Own translation: In 2001 in Germany’s
case, for example, of the direct investment placed in Latin America and the Carribbean around 0.3 billion US-dollars went to
Barbados, 3 billion US-dollars to the Bermudas, around 0.2 billion to the British Virgin Islands, around 5.6 billion to the
Caiman Islands and around 1 billion to the Netherlands Antilles. U.S. companies also invested substantial sums in the tax
havens. In 2002 the following U.S. direct investment stocks were registered there: Barbados 1.5 billion US-dollars, Bermuda
68.9 billion US-dollars and other tax havens 29.3 billion US-dollars. The Carribbean tax havens thereby made up one third of
German and 37% of U.S. direct investment in Latin America and the Carribbean.”
126 Rösler, Peter, op.cit.
127 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for
Development: National and International Perspectives, New York/Geneva 2003.
128 AméricaEconomía, July 2003.
129 Maria Manuel Ramos / José Félix Ribeiro: O Investimento Directo Espanhol: da América Latina para a Europa Continental,
p. 423.
130 Numbers for 1998-1999, op.cit., p. 433.
131 http://www.ftd.de/tm/tk/1055066659117.html?nv=sl
132 Amércia Economia: Ranking 500, July 4-31, 2003, p. 66
133 B2B Magazine, Oct. 22, 2003.
134 http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/10/27/eco036.html
135 Sindicato dos Trabalhadores de Telemarketing e de Radiochamadas do Estado de São Paulo
136 O Estado de São Paulo, 8.10.1999.
137 "Em junho de 2001, o Grupo Santander Banespa tinha ativos totais de R$ 62,192 bilhões -- é o terceiro maior grupo
financeiro privado no País, por esse critério -- e patrimônio líquido de R$ 4,685 bilhões." Own translation: „In June of 2001
the Santander Banespa Group had total actives of R$ 62.192 billion – it is the third largest private financial group in the
country in this category – with an equity capital of R$ 4.685 billion.”
http://www.banespa.com.br/site/servicos/institucional/sn_gruposantander_historia.jsp
138 "Santander/Banespa foi um dos bancos que mais lucraram nos últimos anos. Em 2001, ele teve lucro de R$ 1,089 bilhão; no
ano seguinte esse valor subiu para R$ 2,818 bilhões." Own translation: “Santander/Banespa was one of the banks that earned
the most in the last years. In 2001 its profits amounted to R$ 1,089 billion, in the following year this number rose to R$ 2,818
billion.”? http://www.vermelho.org.br/diario/2003/1029/1029_bancarios-sp.asp
139 "El Grupo Santander es la primera entidad financiera de España y la segunda de la Zona Euro, con una capitalización, a 31
de diciembre de 2002, de 31.185 millones de euros. Cuenta con una plantilla de 104.000 empleados, de los que el 65% están
fuera de España." Own translation : « The Santander Group is the first financial entity in Spain and ranks second in the Eurozone,
with a capitalization of 31.185 billion Euros. It has 104,000 employees, of which 65% are outside of Spain. «
http://www.gruposantander.com/pagina/indice/0,,412_1_2,00.html
140 "Depois de lucrar R$ 1,067 bilhão no último semestre, o Santander Banespa dá início em São Paulo a demissões em massa,
apesar dos inúmeros compromissos de que não haveria cortes na instituição" Own translation : « After having obtained profits
of R$ 1.067 billion in the last semester, the Santander Banesapa [Group] initiated massive layoffs, despite having promissed
innumerable times that nobody would be dismissed within the institution. »
http://www.vermelho.org.br/diario/2003/1025/1025_banespa.asp
141 Maria Manuel Ramos / José Félix Ribeiro: O Investimento Directo Espanhol: da América Latina para a Europa Continental,
p. 422.
142 CEPAL: La inversión extranjera en América Latina y el Caribe, 2002, Santiago de Chile: March 2003, p. 19.
143 op.cit.
144 Numbers of 1998-1999, op.cit., p. 433.
145 http://www.endesa.es/english/index.html
146 dpa/afx, 22.10.2003
147 AméricaEconomia, 4.-31.Jul.2003, p. 68.
148 See, e.g.: http://www.irn.org/programs/biobio/
149 „Venda de Cachoeira Dourada e Contrato de compra de energia foram lesivos a Goiás. O presidente da Central Energética
de Goiás (Celg), José Paulo Loureiro, disse em depoimento à CPI de Cachoeira Dourada nesta quarta-feira (25), que o contrato
de compra de energia pela estatal da usina de Cachoeira Dourada foi "extremamente lesivo ao Estado de Goiás. "Tanto foi que
gerou um prejuízo, de setembro de 1997 a fevereiro deste ano de R$ 715 milhões", afirmou.”Source:
http://www.paulogarciapt.com/acervo.asp?materia=2100 Own translation: The selling of Cachoeira Dourada and the energy
supply contract were harmful to the state of Goiás. The president of the Central Energética de Goiás (Celg), José Paulo
Loureiro, declared to the Parliamentary Investigation Committee (CPI) of Cachoeira Dourada this Wednesday (25), that the
energy supply contract for the state enterprise Cachoeira Dourada was extremely harmful for the state of Goiás. “It went that
far as to produce losses, between September of 1997 and February of this year, of 715 million Reais, “ he said.”?
150 3ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Goiás
151 http://www.paulogarciapt.com/acervo.asp?materia=2100
152 Catalano, José: Las negociaciones MERCOSUR-Unión Europea: una visión desde la sociedad civil, preliminary version,
December 2002, p. 30.
153 Enlace Mapuche Internacional, 27.3.2002: Torrelli, Claudia: MERCOSUR for sale? The EU’s FTAA and the need to
oppose it. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) & Transnational Institute (TNI), Info Brief, Amsterdam August 2003, p. 7.
154Own translation of the following original text: „Brasilien gilt vielen großen Stahlherstellern als Schlüsselregion für
Investitionen - teils wegen der langfristig guten wirtschaftlichen Aussichten der Region, aber auch wegen der geringen
Arbeitskosten, durch die viele der dortigen Stahlwerke hoch profitabel sind.”Taken from: FTD, 24.11.2003.
155 Amércia Economia: Ranking 500, 4.-31.July 2003, p. 76.
156 FTD, 24.11.2003. Own translation of the following original text: „[a]llerdings stehen die Expansionsbemühungen in
Konflikt mit dem Ziel der staatlichen brasilianischen Entwicklungsbank BNDES, über eine Fusion aller wichtigen
brasilianischen Stahlhersteller einen großen Teil der Branche in brasilianischem Besitz zu halten.”
157 Quelle: ambientebrasil.com.br, VEGA DO SUL É AUTUADA POR VAZAMENTO DE CROMO EM SC, 11.8.2003. „O
órgão ambiental de Santa Catarina, Fatma, autuou a empresa Vega do Sul-Arcelor, localizada em São Francisco do Sul (SC),
por vazamento de substâncias altamente cancerígenas. Mesmo sem possuir LAO – Licença Ambiental de Operação para
operar a empresa omitiu a ocorrência de vazamentos no processo de cromatização, segundo o relatório, emitido pelo FATMA
nos dias 3 e 4 de julho e divulgado no site http://www.sfs.com.br”

158 SICHERHEITSDATENBLATT, Dokument Nr. SDS-08, Ausgabe 009, EC NR. 215-607-8, 30.6.2002, Source:
http://www.elementischromium.com/pdf/042104SDS-008.pdf
159 Adopted by the General Assembly of the UN in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
160 Put down in the International Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on December 19, 1966 and ratified in the
„Social Pact”in 1976.
161 FT 22.12.2003.
162 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): World Investment Report 2003 - FDI Policies for
Development: National and International Prespectives, New York/Geneva 2003.
163 Ibid.
164 Rösler, Peter: Auslandsinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-Amerika verein, July 30, 2003. Own translation of the
following original text: "Es fällt auf, dass nach Angaben der Zentralbanken und Fachministerien Lateinamerikas ein Fünftel
der ausländischen Direktinvestitionen aus anderen Ländern, d.h. hauptsächlich aus Steueroasen, kam. Die Steueroasen
scheinen aber lediglich Durchgangsstationen für die Investitionen der Unternehmen der Industrieländer zu sein. Denn die
Statistiken der Industrieländer nennen ähnlich hohe Beträge für die Direktinvestitionen ihrer Unternehmen in den Steueroasen
der Karibik."
165 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/pr051103_de.htm
166 "Cross retaliation" in this context is a circumstance, which has a side-effect for the „old Europe”governments which is not
undesired: The creation of brawl and displeasure between the different US- American export sectors, when, e.g., citrus farmers
have income losses due to the punitive tariffs imposed on their product in Europe because other U.S. export firms infringe the
WTO norms through the preferential tax treatment granted by the U.S. government – and the citrus farmers lastly have to pay
for this – a circumstance which is not negligible in the 2004 U.S. election year: "Nach Angaben aus EU-Kreisen wurden
Warengruppen ausgewählt, die den "maximalen politischen Effekt haben". Orangensaft kam beispielsweise deshalb auf die
Liste, weil davon US-Staaten wie Florida direkt betroffen sind, in denen die Präsidentenwahl entschieden wird." Carsten
Matthäus: Bushs riskantes Spiel mit Stahl und Büstenhaltern, in: Spiegel Online, see:
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,275552,00.html Own translation: „According to EU-information groups of goods
were chosen, which have the „maximum political effect.”Orange juice, e.g., was included in the list, because states like
Florida, which are crucial for the outcome of presidential elections, are directly affected.”
167 "The Appellate Body, on November 10, 2003, issued its report on the complaints brought to the WTO by Brazil, China, the
European Communities, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland against the United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products. It upheld most of the Panel's conclusions that the U.S. measures were
inconsistent with the WTO Safeguards Agreement and the GATT 1994", http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm
168 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm#248_259_abr, also see:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/pr101103_en.htm,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/memo101103_en.htm
169 see: EU seeks retaliatory and protective measures in US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act dispute, Brussels, September 22, 2003:
"Three years after the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was found incompatible with WTO rules, the EU is still waiting for
concrete signs that the US will repeal its condemned legislation. Confronted with persisting inaction, the EU has decided to
reactivate the arbitration process that will decide on retaliatory measures. [...] But, the persisting inaction of the U.S. leaves the
EU no other option than to exercise this right under the WTO."
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/pr220903_en.htm
170 Robert B.Zoellick: America will not wait for the won't-do countries, in: FT, Sep. 22, 2003, p .23, siehe:
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-09-22-ft.htm
171 See the revealing speach of Pascal Lamy: "Trade Crisis?", European Institute, Washington, 4 November 2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla198_en.htm
172 Topstory-report, BBC World News, 18. Nov. 2003
173 Own translation of the following original text: "Das Rennen [zwischen USA und Europa] wird nicht nur in Lateinamerika
weitergehen, aber es ist das Spielfeld, auf dem sich mit ALCA und mit dem EU-MERCOSUR-Vorhaben die Konkurrenz
zwischen Euro und Dollar am deutlichsten widerspiegelt." Taken from: Ling, Martin: Lateinamerika im Visier der
Europäischen Union. Europa wetteifert mit den USA um den Markt der wiederentdeckten "Neuen Welt", in: Lateinamerika
Nachrichten No. 349/350, Berlin: July/August 2003, p. 7.
174 Own translation of the following original text: „Deutsche Wirtschaftsbeamte sehen einer möglichen gesamtamerikanischen
Freihandelszone mit Unbehagen entgegen.”taken from: Daniel Boss: Wettlauf mit den USA. Deutsche Wirtschaftsbeamte
sehen einer möglichen gesamtamerikanischen Freihandelszone mit Unbehagen entgegen, in: ila No. 260, Nov. 15, 2002, p. 34.
175 Own translation of the following original text: „Die EU hat bislang nicht überzeugend demonstrieren können, daß die
umfassende Agenda der neuen Generation von Handelsabkommen eine breite sozial gerechte und ökologisch verträgliche
Entwicklung im Süden fördert. In der europäischen Handelspolitik macht ein anderer Ton die Musik: Der Gemeinschaft geht
es um die Ausweitung ihrer Exporte in die Länder des Südens und der Sicherung neuer Absatzmärkte, besonders im Hinblick
auf Hochtechnologien und Dienstleistungen, aber auch um die Vergrößerung des Flusses an Direktinvestitionen im
verarbeitenden Bereich, für Privatisierungsprogramme und für Investitionen in extraktive Industrien. Strategisch ist die EU
darauf aus, durch rasche Fortführung der Verhandlungen mit dem MERCOSUR und mit den afrikanischen AKPStaaten, der
Handelsmacht USA, die mit neuen Pan-Amerikanischen Freihandelszone (FTAA) und dem "African Growth and Opportunity Act" (vgl. W&E 1/2003) auf die gleichen Märkte schielt, ein handelspolitisches Gegengewicht entgegenzusetzen. Eine
entwicklungsförderliche und differenzierte Behandlung der schwächeren Wirtschaftspartner im Süden erscheint da von
zweitrangiger Bedeutung. Zwar lassen einige der neuen Abkommen sowohl im Hinblick auf den Liberalisierungszeitplan als
auch auf deren Umfang Elemente einer Asymmetrie während der Übergangsphase erkennen, doch wird letztendlich der
wirtschaftlich stärkere Verhandlungsblock den größten wirtschaftlichen Nutzen ziehen.”Taken from: Schilder, Klaus
(WEED): Regionalisierung unter neoliberalem Vorzeichen? Die polit-ökonomische Geographie der EU-Handelspolitik
10.06.2003, http://www.weed-online.org/artikel/18513.html
176 Ling, Martin, op.cit., p. 4.
177 http://www.bdi-online.de/RedDot/Protokoll_final_version_2003.pdf
178 Nunnenkamp, Peter: Foreign Direct Investment in MERCOSUR: The Strategies of European Investors, in: Paolo Giordano
- Chaire MERCOSUR de Sciences Po [edit.]: An Integrated Approach to the European Union - MERCOSUR Association,
2002.
179 Nunnenkamp, Peter: Foreign Direct Investment in MERCOSUR: The Strategies of European Investors, in: Paolo Giordano
- Chaire MERCOSUR de Sciences Po [edit.]: An Integrated Approach to the European Union - MERCOSUR Association,
2002, p. 231.
180 Catalano, José: Las negociaciones MERCOSUR-Unión Europea: una visión desde la sociedad civil, preliminary version,
December 2002, p. 34.
181 Catalano, José: Las negociaciones MERCOSUR-Unión Europea: una visión desde la sociedad civil, preliminary version,
December 2002, p. 37.
182 UNCTAD: FDI AND DEVELOPMENT: The case of privatization-related services, TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2, p. 11.
183 http://www.agbar.es/eng/nt/ntea001.htm
184 Anglian Water is part of AWG Plc, where, among others, the Deutsche Bank AG holds shares amounting to 4.24 %,
http://www.hemscott.co.uk/equities/company/cd02043.htm
185 http://www.aguasargentinas.com.ar/frameset_aguas.html
186 UNCTAD: FDI AND DEVELOPMENT: The case of privatization-related services, TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2, p. 11.
187 Ibid.
188Ibid.
189Ibid.
190 Peterson, Luke Eric (International Institute for Sustainable Development – IISD): Research Note: Emerging Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development, Aug. 2003, p. 9.
191 Tawil, Guido Santiago (M.& M.Bomchil, Buenos Aires): Investor-State-Arbitration : A hot issue in Latin America, 2002,
p. 2.
192 Mercopress, 11. Nov. 2003.
193 Les Echos 12.9.2002: EDF lance une procédure contre le gouvernement argentin.
194 Own translation of the following original text: „Siemens will 500 Mio USD von Argentinien
Berlin (vwd) - Die Siemens AG, München, fordert von Argentinien 500 Mio USD Schadenersatz für die Stornierung eines
Auftrags. Wie aus einer Mitteilung an die US-Börsenaufsicht SEC vom Montag hervorgeht, hat das Unternehmen beim
Internationalen Zentrum zur Beilegung von Investitionsstreitigkeiten (ICSID) der Weltbank ein Schiedsgerichtsverfahren
beantragt. Mit der Stornierung habe Argentinien gegen ein Investitionsabkommen mit Deutschland verstoßen, argumentiert
Siemens.”Taken from: NfA 9.12.2003, see http://www.MERCOSUR-info.com/al/index.shtml
195 Peterson, Luke Eric (International Institute for Sustainable Development – IISD): Research Note: Emerging Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development, Aug. 2003, p. 3.
196 Peterson, Luke Eric (International Institute for Sustainable Development – IISD): Research Note: Emerging Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development, Aug. 2003, p. 5.
197 El País, Uruguay, Oct. 31, 2003: "[U]na reforma constitucional que declara el agua, su uso y preservación, como derecho
humano fundamental, asegurando además la gestión de los recursos hídricos en manos del Estado."
198 El País, Uruguay, 10.12.2003.
199 http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/uruguay.htm
200 A comparison: If you take a look at the competition from the viewpoint USA-Germany the following global image can be
drawn: The total volume of U.S. direct investment amounts to 1.5 billion US-dollars, which is only approximately double that
of German direct investment. See: Peter Rösler: Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-Amerika Verein der
Deutschen Wirtschaft, July 30, 2003. There a direct comparision is made of Germany and the „competitor USA”:
"Zweitwichtigster Industriepartner Lateinamerikas nach den USA: In der verarbeitenden Industrie Lateinamerikas stehen
deutsche Unternehmen weiterhin an 2. Stelle nach ihren Wettbewerbern aus den USA." Own translation: „The second most
important industrial partner of Latin America after the U.S.: In the Latin American manufacturing industry German companies
continue to rank second behind their competitors from the U.S.”
201 Sérgio Oliveira Birchal: European Direct Investment in Brazil, 1969-2000, p. 3-4.
202 Sérgio Oliveira Birchal: European Direct Investment in Brazil, 1969-2000, p. 16.
203 Apart from the „weakness in turnover”the resulting „costs of restructuring for the Brazilian-bussiness”are adduced.
http://www.ftd.de/ub/in/1067066343667.html?nv=sl
204 http://www.n-tv.de/3173891.html
205 http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/09/030923_volksvale.shtml
206 http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/09/030923_volksvale.shtml
207 "Procuradora-Geral do Trabalho."
208 http://www.estado.com.br/editorias/2003/09/26/eco043.html
209 See: Sauter, Hermann: Sozialstandards im Globalisierungsprozess. Inhalt und Durchsetzungsmöglichkeiten, Enquete-
Kommission „Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft. Heruasfordeungen und Antworten”, AU Stud 14/10, Deutscher Bundestag,
p. 5.
210 "Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining."
211 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/content/AboutTheGC/TheNinePrinciples/prin3.htm
212 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp
213 http://www.igmetall.de/pressedienst/2002/074.html
214 Download bei Labournet: http://www.labournet.de/branchen/auto/vw/allg/sozialcharta.pdf
215 Own translation of the following original text: „Das Grundrecht aller Arbeitnehmer/-innen, Gewerkschaften und
Arbeitnehmervertretungen zu bilden und ihnen beizutreten wird anerkannt. Volkswagen und die Gewerkschaften bzw. die
Arbeitnehmervertretungen arbeiten offen und im Geiste einer konstruktiven, kooperativen Konfliktbewältigung zusammen.”
Taken from: http://www.labournet.de/branchen/auto/vw/allg/sozialcharta.pdf
216 „Art.9.° É assegurado o direito de greve, competindo aos trabalhadores decidir sobre a oportunidade de exercê-lo e sobre os
interesses que devam por meio dele defender.”CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL
217 http://www.ftd.de/ub/in/1065243029175.html?nv=se
218 http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/07/14/eco038.html
219 http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/07/14/eco038.html
220 http://www.radiobras.gov.br/materia.phtml?materia=136662&editoria=EC
221 DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, June 2003.
222 Peter Rösler: Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Ibero-Amerika Verein der Deutschen Wirtschaft, July 30,
2003.
223 Maria Silvia Portella de Castro: Mercosul e União Européia: relações econômicas e comercias e as negociações do Acordo
de Cooperação Inter-Regional, January 2003, p. 13-14.
224 Folha de São Paulo, June 4,1999, cited in: Maria Silvia Portella de Castro: Mercosul e União Européia: relações
econômicas e comercias e as negociações do Acordo de Cooperação Inter-Regional, January 2003, p. 13.
225 See, e.g.: Jost, Thomas / Nunnenkamp, Peter: Bestimmungsgründe deutscher Direktinvestitionen in Entwicklungs- und
Reformländern - Hat sich wirklich etwas verändert?, Kiel Working Paper No.1124, Aug. 2002; Peter Nunnenkamp: Foreign
Direct Investment in MERCOSUR: The Strategies of European Investors, in: Paolo Giordano - Chaire MERCOSUR de
Sciences Po [edit.]: An Integrated Approach to the European Union - MERCOSUR Association, 2002.
226 EU trade commissoner Pascal Lamy proudly defines the negotiating agenda as „ambitous.”
227 http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/06/28/eco022.html
228 "GSP: The Generalised system of preferences is a system by means of which preferential tariffs are granted unilaterally to
certain countries on a non-reciprocal basis. It was approved by GATT in 1971, allowing industrialised members to adopt oneway
tariff preferences in favour of developing countries. The waiver was made more general and permanent in 1979 with
adoption of so-called "Enabling Clause" allowing industrialised countries to implement measures extending "differential and
more favourable treatment" to developing countries. The EU launched this preferential system in 1971, in order to help
developing countries sell more of their products in the industrialized countries and build up their own industry. The
preferences under the GSP are granted to exports of specific products from particular countries.", in:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/gentools/glossarycont_en.htm#gsp
229 O Estado de São Paulo, 2.Dez.2003.
230 See: Estado de São Paulo, Dec. 3, 2003, p. B7.
231 Nunnenkamp, Peter: Foreign Direct Investment in MERCOSUR: The Strategies of European Investors, in: Paolo Giordano
- Chaire MERCOSUR de Sciences Po [edit.]: An Integrated Approach to the European Union - MERCOSUR Association,
2002.
232 Quote of the Argentine foreign minister Rafael Bielsa taken from the: Estado de São Paulo 18.11.2003: "Estamos ombro a
ombro com os brasileiros, afirma Bielsa", p. B3. Own translation: “We are side by side with the Brazilians, said Bielsa.”?
233 Own translation of the following original text: "Não queremos perder oportunidades de comércio. Não estamos dispostos a
aceitar uma fórmula que implique autolimitação na nossa perspectiva de acesso a mercados. Para nós, comércio e
investimentos são os temas centrais." Taken from: Estado de São Paulo, 18.11.2003, p. B3., also see: Valor Econômico,
18.11.2003 "Uruguai quer focar investimentos."
234 "Para serviços, o Mercosul continua a defender a aplicação das normas da OMC, incluída a exigência de que o investidor
tenha presença comercial no país receptor do investimento. Sobre compras governamentais só se propõem regras de
transparência, mas nenhum compromisso quanto à abertura para fornecedores estrangeiros. Compras, investimentos e
propriedade intelectual são temas que o Mercosul pretende deixar para a OMC" Estado de São Paulo 17.11.2003. Own
translation: “With respect to services, MERCOSUR continues to defend the aplication of WTO norms, including the demand
that the investor needs to have commercial presence in the recipient country of the investment. Regarding government
procurement, only transparency rules are proposed, but no determination concerning market opening for foreign suppliers.
Government procurement, investment and intellectual property rights are issues which MERCOSUR wants to leave to the
WTO.”?
235 ”?ntegra do discurso de Lula na festa de 50 anos da Petrobras: "Nós não queríamos evitar que empresas estrangeiras
produzissem os nossos navios ou a nossa plataforma. O que nós queríamos era que o nosso dinheiro fosse gasto dentro do
Brasil, para gerar empregos para homens e mulheres brasileiros. E vamos manter a exigência mínima de 65% de conteúdo
nacional nos equipamentos destinados a prospecção marítima do petróleo brasileiro." Own translation: Full text of the speech
by Lula at the fiftieth anniversary of Petrobras: “We did not want to impede that foreign companies produce our ships or our
oil platform. We wanted our money to be spent within Brazil, to generate jobs for Brazilian men and women. And we will
maintain the minimum requirement of 65% of national content with respect to the equipment destinated at offshore oil
prospection of Brazilian oil.”? Taken from: http://www.estadao.com.br/economia/noticias/2003/out/03/79.htm.
236 The Canadian Secretary of Trade Pierre Pettigrew in a lapidary manner called the G-X: „G- more or less.”See: Valor
Econômico Oct. 16, 2003.
237 "Por considerar um tema "sensível", o governo quer transferir para a Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) a
discussão sobre regras para investimentos, que poderiam limitar a liberdade dos países para estabelecer medidas de política
industrial com favorecimento a empresas instaladas no país. Mas os negociadores do Brasil aceitam discutir o chamado
"acesso a mercados em investimentos", garantias ao investidores estrangeiros de tratamento idêntico ao concedido para o
investidor nacional, em setores a serem estabelecidos com a negociação. Essa garantia, aliás já está na Constituição brasileira."
Valor Econômico, 29.10.2003. Own translation: “The [Brazilian] government considers the discussion on investment rules to
be a sensitive issue, as they [the investment rules] could restrict the countries’ liberties to establish industrial policy-measures
which favor resident companies. Therefore the Brazilian government wants to transfer the issue to the WTO. But the Brazilian
negotiators accept to discuss the so-called “market access for investment”?, i.e., guarantees for foreign investors to receive
identical treatment as the national investors, in sectors which are to be established in the negotiation process. This guarantee is
by the way already in the Brazilian Constitution.”?
238 For an explication of the genaral position of Brazil see: Peterson, Luke Eric: Brazil Remains Wary of International
Investment Rules, in: INVEST-SD, June 1, 2003.
239 Valor Econômico, 29.10.2003.
240 Valor Econômico, 29.10.2003.
241 Folha de São Paulo, 2.11.2003.
242 See: Arroyo, Alberto (UAM / ASC, México): Experiencias mejicanas con el TLCAN, in: FDCL-Tagungsgreader: Die
grosse Freihandelszone Amerika (ALCA): Herausforderungen und Alternativen, Berlin 2003.
243 "É importante assinalar que, embora exista a possibilidade dos países membros apresentarem listas de compromissos
específicos, na reforma em curso no GATS países como EUA, União Européia, Japão e Canadá estão pressionando para que
sejam inseridas novas regras que sejam válidas para todos os membros da OMC e para todos os serviços, independentemente
se os países tenham se comprometido ou não em abrir estes serviços ao capital estrangeiro. Na prática, portanto, o suposto
direito dos países de decidirem quais setores desejam abrir pode estar prestes a cair por terra", see: Fátima Mello
(FASE/Rebrip): SERVIÇOS PARA QUEM PRECISA? As negociações de serviços no GATS e na ALCA, July 2002.
244 "Dienstleistungsverhandlungen müssen Märkte öffnen." BDI press statement 29.4.2003. Own translation: „Negotiations on
services have to open up markets.”
245 Own translation of the following original text: "Die deutsche Industrie hat Bestrebungen, mit Hilfe der handelspolitischen
Instrumente wirtschafts- und industriepolitische Ziele auf dirigistischem Weg zu verfolgen, in der Vergangenheit immer eine
klare Absage erteilt und wird dies auch weiterhin tun." Taken from: http://www.bdionline.
de/schwerpunkte_daten/handelspolitische_schutzinstrumente.htm
246 This was expressed by Sigrid Zirbel, who is the person in charge of North- and Latin America at the BDI, during a
conversation with Claudia Torrelli (REDES / CEO / TNI) on June 27, 2003, see: Torrelli, Claudia: MERCOSUR for sale? The
EU’s FTAA and the need to oppose it. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) & Transnational Institute (TNI), Info Letter,
Amsterdam, August 2003, p. 3.
247 „Mitglieder des IAV sind in erster Linie Privatunternehmen aus Deutschland und anderen Ländern Europas mit Interessen
in Lateinamerika, aber auch dortige Firmen mit Verbindungen zu Deutschland und Einzelpersonen. Der Vorstand des IAV
setzt sich aus Geschäftsführern und Vorstandsmitgliedern der Mitgliedsunternehmen sowie aus den Geschäftsführern der
deutschen Auslandshandelskammern in der Region zusammen.”, http://www.ibero-amerikaverein.de/ Own translation:
„Members of the IAV are first of all private companies that pursue interests in Latin America from Germany and other
countries, but also companies in Latin America with connections to Germany and individuals. The board of directors of the
IAV is composed of CEOs of member companies, as well as the directors of the German Aussenhandelskammern [foreign
trade chambers] in the region.”
248 Peter Rösler, vice-director of the Ibero-Amerika Verein, speaks of "oversubsidized agriculture" in some industrial
countries, in: Rösler, Peter: "Freihandel EU-MERCOSUR und FTAA bedroht", http://www.ibero-amerikaverein.de/
249 http://www.mebf.bdi-online.de/reddot/lai.htm
250 Own translation of the following original text: "Die lateinamerikanischen Länder werden in ihrem Bestreben,
Strukturreformen, Privatisierungen, Deregulierung, Liberalisierung und Demokratisierung weiterhin zügig voranzutreiben,
ausdrücklich ermuntert. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist die Schaffung bzw. Konsolidierung verlässlicher rechtlicher
Rahmenbedingungen. [...]Die deutsche Wirtschaft fordert die EU-Kommission erneut auf, die Verhandlungen des geplanten
Abkommens mit den Ländern des MERCOSUR zu beschleunigen. Für einen Verhandlungserfolg mit dem MERCOSUR ist
mehr Flexibilität in der EU-Agrarpolitik notwendig." Taken from: http://www.lateinamerika-konferenz.de/
251 Own translation of the following original text: „Denn keines der EU-Länder mit nennenswerten Investitionen im
MERCOSUR will Terrain aufgeben. Darunter z.B. in Argentinien an erster Stelle Spanien (39%), gefolgt von den USA (28%),
Frankreich (7%), Kanada (6%) und Italien (5%). Gleich um die Jahreswende [2001/2002, Erg.d.A.] belagerte die spanische
Regierung die Casa Rosada (Regierungssitz) in Buenos Aires, um zu erwirken, dass die Gewinne spanischer Firmen in
Argentinien nicht in abgewerteten Pesos, sondern in Devisen nach Spanien transferiert würden. Im Juli 2002 setzen die
spanischen Mitglieder der Fraktion der Volksparteien (EVP, darin die deutsche CDU/CSU und die österreichische ÖVP) im
Europäischen Parlament eine Entschließung zu Argentinien durch, in der Hilfe gefordert, auf die kulturellen Wurzeln
verwiesen und insbesondere auf ein Menschenrecht in modernen Gesellschaften verwiesen wird, nämlich das Recht auf
Eigentum.”Taken from: Küppers, Gaby: It takes four to tango. Nach dem Tango-Effekt hat die EU die Verhandlungsspur mit
dem MERCOSUR verloren, in: ila No. 260, p. 33.

252 Valor Econômico, 28.10.2003.
253 Torrelli, Claudia: MERCOSUR for sale? The EU’s FTAA and the need to oppose it. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO)
& Transnational Institute (TNI), Info Letter, Amsterdam August 2003, p. 3.
254 http://www.encontrobrasilalemanha.com.br/
255 REPORT OF THE 2003 GERMAN-BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC MEETING (XXX MEETING OF THE JOINT
COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND XXI ENTREPRENEURIAL MEETING), see: http://www.iberoamerikaverein.
de/
256 REPORT OF THE 2003 GERMAN-BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC MEETING (XXX MEETING OF THE JOINT
COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND XXI ENTREPRENEURIAL MEETING), see: http://www.iberoamerikaverein.
de/
257 Own translation of the following original text: „Konzentration auf Industriesektor: Für Brasilien ergab sich 1995 nach
Angaben der Zentralbank des Landes folgende Aufteilung: Automobilbau & Kfz-Teilefertigung 32 %, Maschinen & Anlagen
14 %, Chemie 10 %, Pharmazie 9 %, Dienstleistungssektor 9 %, Eisen & Stahl 8 %, Elektrotechnik und
Telekommunikationsprodukte 7 %, Lebensmittelverarbeitung 3 % und Grundstoffsektor (Landwirtschaft und Bergbau) 2
Deutsche Produktion in Lateinamerika viermal so hoch wie Export dorthin: Die Bedeutung des deutschen
Lateinamerika-Engagements wird auch daraus ersichtlich, daß das Produktionsvolumen der deutschen Tochterunternehmen in
Lateinamerika im Jahr 2001 mit ca. 65,3 Mrd den gesamten deutschen Export in die Region (ca.16 Mrd) um mehr als das
vierfache überstieg. Vom Gesamtwert der deutschen Produktion in Lateinamerika entfielen nach Angaben der Bundesbank ca.
23,5 Mrd auf Brasilien und ca. 27,8 Mrd auf Mexiko. (Der US$-Wert des Produktionsvolumens in Brasilien hatte sich durch
die Real-Abwertung verringert.) In diesen beiden Ländern schaffen deutsche Unternehmen etwa 5 % des BIP. An der
Wertschöpfung des Brazilianischen Industriesektors sind sie mit rund 15 % beteiligt.”Taken from: Rösler, Peter:
Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, Iber-Amerika Verein, July, 30, 2003.
258 O Estado de São Paulo, 30.11.2002, see: http://www.estado.com.br/editorias/2002/11/30/eco021.html
259 See the Urgewald-studies at: http://www.urgewald.de
260 Also see: Agência Brasil Sept. 19, 2003.
261 See: Urgewald e.V. Presseerklärung: Deutsch-brasilianische Infrastrukturinitiative nachhaltig ausgestalten. Brasilianische
Umweltschützer fordern deutsche Investoren auf: Hände weg von riskanten Infrastrukturprojekten!, Berlin June 2, 2003,
http://www.urgewald.de
262 Lateinamerika Nachrichten: Das deutsch/brasilianische Bombengeschäft, special number of the Lateinamerika Nachrichten,
Berlin (West) 1980.
263 Estado de São Paulo 20.9.2003.
264 http://www.framatome.com/
265 http://www.arevagroup.com
266 Agência Brasil 19.9.2003.
267 Amazonia.org.br: The new Pluri-Annual Plan is unveiled, Sept. 2, 2003.
268 http://www.abtc.org.br/info.php?codigo=1902
269 Estado de São Paulo, June 25, 2003.
270 "[...] para a construção de uma América do Sul mais próspera", Folha de São Paulo, July 5, 2003.
271 http://mebf.arcelor.com/about.htm
272 "[...] Der MEBF begleitet die Freihandelsverhandlungen zwischen der EU und dem MERCOSUR von Seiten der
Wirtschaft. Nach dem Scheitern der WTO-Verhandlungen in Cancún gewinnen die EU-MERCOSUR-Verhandlungen und
damit auch der MEBF an Bedeutung. [...] Im Rahmen der IV. MEBF-Konferenz werden Papiere mit gemeinsamen
MERCOSUR / EU-Empfehlungen zu den Bereichen Marktzugang, Investitionen und Dienstleistungen verabschiedet und in
den Verhandlungsprozess eingebracht. Finanzminister Eichel, der brasilianische Wirtschaftsminister Furlan und EUKommissar
Liikanen haben ihre Teilnahme bereits zugesagt. Weitere hochrangige Politiker aus dem MERCOSUR und der EU
werden erwartet."
http://www.ixpos.de/frameset.htm?content=http://www.ixpos.de/news/meldungen/BDI105.html?prevHome=1
Own translation: „[...] The MEBF is part of the free trade negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR from the side of
business. After the failure of the WTO negotiations in Cancún, the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations and with them also the
MEBF are gaining importance. [...] At the IV MEBF conference papers with joint MERCOSUR/EU-recommendations for the
areas of market access, investment and services were passed and brought into the negotiation process. [German] Secretary of
Finance Eichel, the Brazilian Secretary of Commerce Furlan and EU Commisary Liikanen have already confirmed their
participation. Other high-ranking politicians from the EU and MERCOSUR are expected to participate.”
273 http://mebf.arcelor.com/about.htm
274 http://mebf.arcelor.com/rio.htm
275 Torrelli, Claudia: MERCOSUR for sale? The EU’s FTAA and the need to oppose it. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO)
& Transnational Institute (TNI), Info Brief, Amsterdam, Aug. 2003, p. 3.
276 http://mebf.arcelor.com/pdf/MEBF_Rio_Declaration.pdf
277 MERCOSUR/European Union Business Forum: Brasilia Declaration, Brasília, Oct. 2003.
278 FAX from Manuel Marin / Martin Bangemann, see: http://mebf.arcelor.com/pdf/EU_reaction_Rio.pdf: "On behalf of the
European Commission we would like to express our appreciation once again for the results achieved by the MERCOSUR-EU
Business Forum (MEBF)."
279 http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/114120.htm
280 Speech by Commissioner Pascal Lamy to the United Nations, October 31, 2003 "IS THERE LIFE AFTER CANCUN?"
281 http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/09/030911_casssuca2mp.shtml
282 EU: DG Trade: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/investment/conswtoag_inv.htm
283 Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament, and to the Economic and Social
Committee: Reviving the DDA Negotiations - the EU Perspective, Brussels, Nov. 26, 2003, p. 2.
284 See Alexandra Strickner (TIP/IATP Geneva): Trade Talks remain stalled as major powers show no flexibility. Trade
negotiating bodies to be reestablished early next year, Dec. 18, 2003.
285 Ratifiziert hat Brasilien das UN-Übereinkommen über Ausländische Schiedssprüche vom 10.6.1958, sowie die PanamaÜbereinkunft
von 1975, die Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, in welcher die jeweiligen
nationalen Handelskammern vertreten sind.
286 Auf portugiesisch: "acordos bilaterais de promoção e proteção recíproca de investimentos"
287 Déborah Bithiah de Azevedo: Os acordos para a promoção e a proteção recíproca de investimentos assinados pelo Brasil,
Consultoria Legislativa, Câmara dos Deputados, Mai 2001, S.5.
288 CAP”?TULO III, DA POL”?TICA AGR”?COLA E FUNDI”?RIA E DA REFORMA AGR”?RIA, Art. 184. "Compete à União
desapropriar por interesse social, para fins de reforma agrária, o imóvel rural que não esteja cumprindo sua função social,
mediante prévia e justa indenização em títulos da dívida agrária, com cláusula de preservação do valor real, resgatáveis no
prazo de até vinte anos, a partir do segundo ano de sua emissão, e cuja utilização será definida em lei."
289 Siehe hierzu: Déborah Bithiah de Azevedo: Os acordos para a promoção e a proteção recíproca de investimentos assinados
pelo Brasil, Consultoria Legislativa, Câmara dos Deputados, Mai 2001, S.7
290 "Ao capital estrangeiro que se investir no País, será dispensado tratamento jurídico idêntico ao concedido ao capital
nacional em igualdade de condições, sendo vedadas quaisquer discriminações não previstas na presente lei." Art.2°, LEI Nº
4.131, DE 3 DE SETEMBRO DE 1962
291 Alteração à Lei do Capital Estrangeiro LEI Nº 4.390, DE 29 DE AGÔSTO DE 1964: The there changed articles are:
"artigos 4º, 5º, 7º, 9º, 10, 11, o parágrafo único do artigo 25, artigos 28 e 43."
292 See: AHK Brasil / Ernst&Young: So geht's...Besteuerungen von Unternehmen in Brasilien, 1.Aufl. 2003, pp.18.
293 "Define critérios para a aplicação de penalidades relacionadas ao fluxo de capitais estrangeiros" RESOLUÇÃO Nº 2883 de
30 de JULHO de 2001.
294 The contas CC-5 where introduced by the Banco Central through the Carta-Circular n°5 on February 27, 1969.
295 Cited by: Idalvo Toscano: As Contas CC-5: um caso particular de flexibilização do mercado cambial, in: Reinaldo
Gonçalves / Cristina França / Idalvo Toscano: O Brasil nas negociações internacionais de serviços e investimentos, Revista
Argumento: Inesc, Oct. 2002, p.151.
296 „As contas CC-5, utilizadas para remessas de dinheiro para o exterior e vice-versa, registraram saldo negativo de US$ 1,3
bilhão nos nove primeiros meses do ano. No ano passado, US$ 9,107 bilhões foram mandados para o exterior por meio das
CC-5. Só em outubro de 2002, as remessas chegaram a atingir US$ 1,725 bilhão, quando o país passava por uma crise de
confiança em razão das eleições presidenciais.”Agência Brasil 8.10.2003
297 FHC: Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazilian president 1995-2002.
298 "Os documentos das negociações com o GATS indicam que o governo brasileiro liderado pelo presidente Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, antes de deixar o posto, decidiu-se por posições mais agressivas que as de qualquer membro da OMC
quanto à questão da liberalização de serviços. Em seus pedidos formais de negociação, o Brasil investiu contra os subsídios
para programas públicos e defendeu abertamente a eliminação de isenções concedidas a monopólios e setor público. Na
medida em que as diretrizes para as negociações formais prestigiam as solicitações de barganha apresentadas pelos países em
desenvolvimento, o fato de que estas solicitações tenham, portanto, partido do Brasil, beneficia as corporações transnacionais.
Quaisquer concessões feitas ao Brasil serão automaticamente estendidas, a partir da cláusula da nação mais favorecida, a todos
os membros da OMC. Assim, as transnacionais norte-americanas e européias, que dominam completamente o comércio
internacional de serviços, vão tirar vantagens da posição de barganha brasileira assumida no GATS pelo Brasil." Ellen Gould:
A Posição do Brasil nas Negociações do GATS (Acordo Geral sobre Comércio de Serviços), p. 1, downloaded from:
http://www.rebrip.org.br/publique/media/Ellen%20Gould.doc. Own translation: “The GATS negotiation documents show that
the Brazilian government, led by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, before leaving his post, decided to take a more
aggressive position regarding the issue of the liberalization of services, than all other WTO members. In its negotiation
requests Brazil spoke out against subsidies for public programs and openly defended the elimination of tax-exemptions
conceded to monopolies and the public sector. If the formal negotiation guidelines favor the bargaining proposal presented by
the developing countries, the fact that this position is advantegeous for Brazil, benefits the transnational corporations. Every
concession made to Brazil will automatically be extended, through the MFN clause, to all WTO members. In this way the
North American and European transnationals, which completely dominate the international trade of services, will take
advantage of the Brazilian bargaining position, which was assumed in the GATS by Brazil.”?
299 "EM 1997, a LDB (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases) abriu essa possibilidade e nós a regulamentamos. Até então, o ensino superior
não podia ter fins lucrativos." Paulo Renato Souza, in: Estado de São Paulo Aug. 20, 2003. Own translation: In 1997 the LDB
law opened up this possibility and we regulated it. Until then, higher education could not be profit-oriented.”?
300 Paulo Renato Souza: Post-Secondary Education and Opportunities for Investment and Trade, p. 1.
301 In order to give Brazil another credit the World Bank demanded, among other things, again that the Brazilian universities as
a whole should be privatized. see Folha de São Paulo July 8, 2003.
302 Own translation of the following original text: „O objetivo, na maioria dos casos, é adquirir as instituições, injetar recursos,
participar da gestão e finalmente revender as faculdades e universidades por um preço multiplicado." Estado de São Paulo,
Aug. 20, 2003
303 See Maria Silvia Portella de Castro: Mercosul e União Européia: relações econômicas e comercias e as negociações do
Acordo de Cooperação Inter-Regional, January 2003, p. 35.
304 There are no details available on the requests of the European Commission to Brazil and the MERCOSUR within the
framework of the negotiations on the „association treaty”, except for the avowal of the EU to treat the issue of „investment”in
analogy to the Doha-agenda of the WTO. Also see below.
305 GATS-2000 Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil, p. ii.,
http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
306 See the IMF website at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2003/bra/04/index.htm: "Brazil - Letter of Intent", November
21, 2003: "This Letter of Intent of the government of Brazil describes the policies that Brazil intends to implement in the
context of its request for financial support from the IMF."
307 Siehe PAULO NOGUEIRA BATISTA JR. (USP / FGV-EAESP): DIRETO AO PONTO, in: Agência Carta Maior,
16.Dez.2003: „O superávit primário passou de 3,5% do PIB em 2000 para 3,6% em 2001, 4% em 2002 e 4,3% em 2003”, was
auch tiefe Rückschlüsse auf die aktuelle Regierung zulassen mag.
308 Es gilt in Fragen des Schulden- und Zinsdienstes für die Regierung Lula der gleiche Grundsatz wie für die Regierung
Cardoso, siehe BBC Mundo: Economista critica pressão externa por mais exportações, zitierend Werner Baer, Professor der
University of Illinois: "Mas, à medida que os Estados Unidos, a Europa e o FMI forçam o Brasil a manter em dia o serviço da
dívida externa, eles forçam o governo brasileiro, indiretamente, a enfatizar o crescimento das exportações [...] Sem essa
pressão, ou se fosse perdoada parte da dívida externa, isso também diminuiria a pressão sobre o governo de enfatizar o setor
externo e ele poderia aumentar as despesas internas para melhorar a situação dos pobres.", Quelle:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2002/021004_baerrg.shtml
309 GATS 2000. Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil, see:
http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
310 GATS 2000. Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil, see:
http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
311 GATS 2000. Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil, see:
http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
312 http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
313 http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf
314 Mann, Howard (IISD): Who owns „your”water? Reclaiming water as a public good under international trade and
investment law, IISD, August 2003, p. 3.
315 Download at: http://www.menschen-recht-wasser.de/downloads/4_2_un_comment.pdf
316 See http://www.menschen-recht-wasser.de/menschenrecht-wasser/vereinte-nationen.php
317 Base year 2001, in: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): FDI and Development: The Case
of Privatization-related Services FDI: Trends, Impact and Policy Issues, TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2, Sept. 12, 2003, p. 3
318 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/services/index_en.htm
319 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/index_en.htm
320 Ibid.
321 Own translation of the following orignial text: „Allerdings beruht [...] unsere heutige Globalisierung wesentlich auf
international vereinbarten und national ratifizierten Regeln über die Liberalisierung von Finanzmärkten, Investitionen und dem
Güterhandel. Es vergeht kaum ein Tag, an dem auf internationaler Ebene nicht über weitere Übereinkommen verhandelt wird.
Staatsgewalt im Sinne von Gestaltung und Ordnung durch internationale Regelung und nationale Umsetzung findet daher
statt." Taken from: Stoll, Peter-Tobias: Globalisierung und Legitimation, Göttingen May 19, 2003, p. 4, downloaded from:
http://www.cege.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/Veranstaltungen/antrittsvorlstoll.pdf
322 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/gov_proc/index_en.htm
323 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm
324 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/gov_proc/index_en.htm
325 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/intro/ip03_1014.htm
326 The English version of the agreement can be found, e.g., at: http://www.handel-entwicklungmenschenrechte.
org/fileadmin/christian/Chile-EU-AssociationAgreement.pdf
327 See: Republic of Chile: Investment and Transparency Provisions in Chile's FTAs with the E.U. and U.S.A. Presentation
before the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on April 10, 2003.
328 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/chile/assoc_agr/ip02_1696.htm
329 Taken from: Küppers, Gaby: Es darf geschröpft werden. Das EU-Chile-Abkommen ist unter Dach und Fach, in: ila No. 260
Nov. 2002, p. 33.
330 Own translation of the following original text: „Die EU ist bestrebt, darin umfangreiche Zugeständnisse an internationale
Investoren zu verankern (z.B. Rechtsgarantien zum Schutz ausländischer Investoren, eine Meistbegünstigungsklausel, Schutz
vor Enteignung und Verstaatlichung, freier Gewinntransfer sowie ein internationaler Streitschlichtungsmechanismus). Das
Europäische Parlament hat sich bereits 1999 dafür eingesetzt, daß ein rechtlich verbindlicher Verhaltenskodex für
ausländische Investoren in Entwicklungsländern in den Anhang zukünftiger Abkommen aufgenommen wird, der die
Investoren zur Einhaltung sozialer, menschenrechtlicher und ökologischer Mindeststandards verpflichtet. Einige der neuen
EU-Handelsabkommen räumen internationalen Investoren tendenziell einen weitreichenderen Investitionsschutz ein, als in
anderen multilateralen Initiativen bislang beschlossen. Insgesamt ist daher zu befürchten, dass über den WTO-Rahmen hinaus
das bereits tot gesagte Multilaterale Investitionsabkommen (MAI) quasi durch die Hintertür auch in bilateralen und regionalen
Verträgen wiederaufleben könnte.”Taken from: Schilder, Klaus (WEED): Regionalisierung unter neoliberalem Vorzeichen?
Die polit-ökonomische Geographie der EU-Handelspolitik 10.06.2003, http://www.weed-online.org/artikel/18513.html
331 Konrad von Moltke (International Institute for Sustainable Development): European Union / MERCOSUR Negotiations.
The Environment and Sustainable Development Dimension, edited by: WWF European Policy Office, Belgium & WWF
Brazil, April 2002, p. 23.

FDCL
Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum Chile-Lateinamerika e.V.
Centro de Investigación y Documentación Chile-América Latina
Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação Chile-América Latina
Research and Documentation Center Chile-Latin America
Gneisenaustraße 2a
10961 Berlin, Alemania, Alemanha
Fon: 49-(0)30-693 40 29
Fax: 49-(0)30-692 65 90
email: fdcl-berlin(at)t-online.de

FDCL - Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum Chile-Lateinamerika

FDCLForschungs- und DokumentationszentrumChile-Lateinamerika

FDCL
Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum
Chile-Lateinamerika